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Abstract
We provide new evidence about the mechanisms linking resource-related income
shocks to conflict. To do so, we combine temporal variation in international
drug prices with new data on spatial variation in opium suitability to examine
the effect of opium profitability on conflict in Afghanistan. District level results
indicate a conflict-reducing effect over the 2002-2014 period, both in a reduced-
form setting and with three different instrumental variables. We provide evidence
for two main mechanisms. First, the importance of contest effects depends on the
degree of violent group competition over valuable resources. By using data on the
drug production process, ethnic homelands, and Taliban versus pro-government
influence, we show that on average group competition for suitable districts is
relatively low in Afghanistan. Second, we highlight the role of opportunity costs by
showing that opium profitability positively affects household living standards, and
becomes more important after a sudden rise in unemployment due to the dissolution
of large armed militias after an exogenous policy change.
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1. Introduction
An important strand of the resource-curse literature examines how resource-related
income shocks are linked to conflict (e.g., Brückner and Ciccone, 2010; Morelli and
Rohner, 2015; Berman et al., 2017). Yet, we’ve only begun to understand the micro-
foundations behind the resource-conflict-nexus. After focusing on the aggregate country
level for many years, recent contributions at the micro level have discovered large
heterogeneities across different commodities and countries (e.g., Dube and Vargas, 2013).
Our paper makes three main contributions, which relate to the the contest or rapacity
hypothesis – where fights about valuable resources increase conflict – and the opportunity
cost effect – where higher resource prices improve living conditions and lower conflict.
First, we augment the contest hypothesis by highlighting that one has to consider the
degree of competition between groups that fight for valuable resources. Afghanistan is
an ideal setting to analyze the role of group competition, as it comprises many ethnic
groups, but at the same time the conflict is mainly between two opposing sides since
2001. Our results show that higher opium prices reduce conflict incidence and intensity
in Afghanistan. We provide evidence that, in line with our hypothesis, there is on average
little between-group competition about opium production sites, and further show that the
conflict-reducing effect of opium is stronger in districts that are more plausibly dominated
by the Taliban. On the contrary, existing evidence for Colombia suggests a rapacity
effect as rising cocaine prices lead to more conflict (Angrist and Kugler, 2008; Mejia
and Restrepo, 2015). Both findings are in line with our hypothesis as in the setting of
Colombia, rival groups compete for cocaine production grounds.
Second, we further examine and verify the main hypothesis in Dube and Vargas
(2013). They show that positive price changes of relatively more labor-intensive goods
reduce conflict because they increase the opportunity costs of joining rebel groups and
engaging in fighting. Afghanistan, which is characterized by a weak labor market and by
a large share of people working in agriculture, provides a good example to cross-validate
the external validity of this important hypothesis. There are only two main crops that
are feasible to produce all across the country; opium, which is very labor-intensive, and
wheat, which requires less labor (Mansfield and Fishstein, 2016).1 Accordingly, a relative
decline in opium prices causes marginal producers to shift towards wheat production and
decreases labor demand.2 In absence of good alternatives, joining a rebel group like the
1Our analysis does not explicitly consider other crops. We do not neglect their importance in certain
areas, especially when they are intercropped (i.e., when farmers can combine their cultivation on
the same land) and when they allow cultivation over two or three seasons per year. However, as
each individual crop is negligible in importance compared to opium and the cultivation of these
alternatives is restricted to certain areas, we assume that shocks to the profitability of these crops
are not systematically biasing the effect of the exogenous opium profitability.
2According to UNODC (2004) between 80% to 90% of landowners and farmers decide on their own
what they plant, which will usually be the most profitable crop.
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Taliban is one of the few options (e.g., Bove and Elia, 2013). We use survey data to
verify that opium profitability indeed matters for well-being at the household level, and
show that the apparent reliance on opium increases after an exogenous policy shock that
deprived people of an important alternative source of income.
Exploring those mechanisms helps to understand the role of opium in the Afghan
conflict, which caused more than 100.000 battle-related deaths since 2002. In addition
to learning more about this individual case, lessons from this conflict might turn out to
be useful for other cases. Afghanistan resembles other countries, in that it has a weak
government that cannot effectively enforce its monopoly of violence as well as a high
level of ethnic fractionalization and weak labour market with few opportunities of formal
employment.
Third, we establish causality through the combination of novel data with different
identification strategies. In particular, by combining temporal variation in international
drug prices with a new dataset on spatial variation in opium suitability (Kienberger et al.,
2017), we can observe changes in opium profitability across time and districts. We exploit
patterns in consumer preferences in the drug market and use the international price of
heroin (which is made of opium) and of complements to heroin, along with local opium
prices in a reduced-form setting to verify the causal interpretation of our findings. In
addition, we propose two alternative identification strategies in an instrumental variable
setting, based on climatic differences and changes in legal opioid prescriptions in the
United States. All these strategies lead to the same result. We find that a higher opium
profitability consistently reduces both conflict incidence and intensity.
Our dataset allows us to identify if this effect is indeed driven by changes in
opportunity costs. First, we use different waves of the National Risk and Vulnerability
Assessment (NRVA) to show that the gains from higher opium profitability reach the
average household. We find consistently higher food consumption and living standards
using various indicators, suggesting that a more profitable opium economy increases the
opportunity costs of fighting. Second, we georeference data provided by the United
Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) on drug markets, labs, and potential
trafficking routes (see among other reports, UNODC, 2016). We argue that districts which
do not only cultivate opium in its raw form, but also process and trade it can capture a
larger share of the value added along the supply chain. This affects both the intensive
margin (higher revenues) as well as the extensive margin (more people benefiting). We
conceptualize this by using simple indices and network-based variants of market access
(Donaldson and Hornbeck, 2016). If there was strong between-group competition in
the Afghan drug market, we would expect more fighting in those districts. The conflict-
reducing effect is, however, even stronger in those districts that feature further processing
steps and have high drug-market access. This is in line with an explanation based on
the opportunity costs of fighting, and implausible if there was strong between-group
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competition in the drug market (as it is apparently the case in Colombia, see, Angrist
and Kugler, 2008; Mejia and Restrepo, 2015).
We complement the evidence on little competition between rival groups for suitable
districts in Afghanistan by relying on the geographical distribution of ethnic homelands
(Weidmann et al., 2010). We compute whether a district is ethnically mixed and how
many ethnic groups it features. Building on the literature about the role of ethnic groups
for conflict (e.g., Esteban et al., 2012), we would expect no or a smaller conflict-reducing
effect in ethnically heterogeneous districts if there was strong violent competition between
those groups. We find no significant differences, supporting our hypothesis of limited
group competition.
Furthermore, our hypothesis on the role of group competition for suitable districts
would predict that the conflict-reducing effects should be the strongest in districts that
are plausibly dominated by one group. We exploit the fact that after 2001 almost all
fighting occurs between pro-government groups including Western military forces and
the Taliban. We use maps on the historical Taliban presence and the homelands of the
Pashtun ethnic group, as well as data about the location of foreign military bases and
main cities to measure whether a district is (i) more plausibly controlled by the Taliban
or (iii) controlled by the government or foreign military.3 With regard to the first point,
we find that the conflict-reducing effect after 2001 is stronger in areas that are more likely
controlled by the Taliban. This supports qualitative evidence about the ideological turn
of the group towards protecting opium farmers and their apparently strong relations with
the opium economy. The finding is also in line with anecdotal evidence that the group is
acting as a stationary bandit, which maximizes revenues in the districts it controls.
Regarding the second point, we analyze the role of the Afghan government and foreign
military more specifically. The degree to which the illegality of opium influences conflict
decisively depends on actual government strategies, i.e, control and enforcement. In
Mexico, for instance, the culmination of violence in recent years coincides with the
government taking stricter actions and enforcement, potentially breaking up existing and
more peaceful equilibria among drug cartels and the government (for studies on Mexico
see, for instance, Dell, 2015; Mejía et al., 2015). Illegality increases profits and the risk of
production, as well as fostering the creation of organized criminal groups, that fight for
suitable areas and rents. Another dimension of government influence is that if rules are
enforced, this creates an incentive for opium farmers to cooperate and finance the Taliban
who offer protection against those measures. Consequently, this can lead to more fights
between Taliban and government (Peters, 2009), and a smaller or no conflict-reducing
effect.
The foreign coalition officially takes a strong stance on drugs in general and opium in
3 The Taliban are initially a Pashtun group (although not exclusively anymore), so that Pashtun presence
makes it easier to establish a presence of the Taliban in a district.
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particular. Several United Nations Security Council (UNSC) bulletins claim resolute
actions against drug producers and traffickers. According to our data, we find no
evidence of a heterogeneous effect according to the presence of the foreign military
forces. This is in line with statements by the US military leadership who do not regard
“anti-drug enforcement” as part of their agenda.4 To measure government influence, we
follow Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2014) and use the distance to the capital as a
measure of the Afghan government’s influence. To account for the specific topography
of Afghanistan, we do not only measure the distance in a straight-line, but also compute
two- and three-dimensional road distances and estimated travel times to Kabul and other
big cities. We generally find no moderating effect of any of those approximations. The
influence of the government, leading to potential conflict with producers of de jure illegal
crops, seems to be confined to a radius of about 75 km or 2 hours travel time to Kabul.
Finally, we use a policy change in the Western military strategy to further shed light
on the difficulties associated with nation-building during and after a military intervention,
and suggest some important trade-offs. In a nutshell, between 2001 and approximately
2005 the Western forces financially supported warlords and local strongholds to build a
strong anti-Taliban coalition. Estimates report that several hundred thousands of men
were armed and became part of those militias, and that more than 60% of the provincial
governors “were leaders of armed groups and most of the remaining ones had links to the
latter” during that time (Giustozzi, 2009, p. 91). Around 2005, the Western coalition
switched their strategy towards a nation-building approach that attempted to pacify and
“clean” Afghan politics by putting pressure on the Afghan government to force political
leaders and governors to give up and abandon their connection to the militias (Giustozzi,
2009, p. 94ff.). In the following, many trained and armed men who were part of those
groups lost a substantial source of income and the reliance on other income sources
like opium production assumedly increased. By exploiting the approximate timing of
this change, we can show that the connection between drug profitability and conflict
indeed becomes much stronger after 2005. This suggests a trade-off between reducing the
influence of non-state armed groups and fighting the production of an illegal resource at
the same time. Both policy goals apparently cannot be achieved simultaneously.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant theoretical considerations
and the related literature, Section 3 introduces the data, and Section 4 the empirical
4 The official views are visible in, for instance, the 2004 UNSC Resolution 1563 stressing “the
importance of extending central government authority to all parts of Afghanistan, [...], and
of combating narcotics trade and production” (see http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1563,
accessed June 14, 2018). When asked about the actual approach of the military, Jean-Luc
Lemahieu, who was head of the UNODC in Afghanistan from 2009 to 2013, is quoted as saying
“drug control wasn’t a priority.” Other sources at the US government are quoted with an
informal bargain that they “would not pursue top Afghan allies who were involved in the drug
trade.” Source: http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/afghanistan-the-making-of-a-narco-state-
20141204, accessed June 14, 2018.
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strategy. The main results are presented in Section 5. We investigate heterogeneity
of the results and the underlying channels in Section 6. We discuss sensitivity tests in
Section 7. Section 8 summarizes and provides policy implications.
2. Theoretical considerations and contributions to
the literature
A. Theoretical considerations
From a theoretical perspective, it is ex ante unclear in which direction income in general,
and opium-related income in particular, affects conflict. The existing literature mainly
distinguishes between two channels, the opportunity costs mechanism (e.g., Grossman,
1991) and the contest model (e.g., Hirshleifer, 1988, 1989, 1995). The first theory
hypothesizes that with a rise in income the opportunity costs of fighting increase, leading
to, on average, less violence. For an individual, joining or supporting anti-government
troops like the Taliban, becomes less attractive after an increase in the profitability of
opium. In contrast, the contest model, or rapacity effect, would predict that with higher
opium profitability, highly suitable territories become relatively more attractive, because
the potential gains from fighting are greater. This would predict relatively more fighting
in attractive districts when opium prices are high.
In Afghanistan, the main alternative to growing poppies is considered to be growing
wheat (UNODC, 2013; Lind et al., 2014) or, if neither is sufficiently attractive, joining a
rebel group.5 Many studies suggest that growing poppies is generally far more profitable
and the gross wheat-to-opium income-ratio ranges between 1:4 to 1:27 (UNODC, 2005,
2013). Nevertheless, Mansfield and Fishstein (2016) criticize this over-simplified approach
for focusing on gross instead of net returns, and ignoring differences in the production
process. We consider this a valid criticism, in particular against the background of the
evidence provided by Dube and Vargas (2013) that labor intensity is crucial to understand
the effect of resource shocks on conflict. The differences in Afghanistan are indeed large.
Mansfield and Fishstein (2016, p. 18) report “opium requiring an estimated 360 person-
days per hectare, compared to an average of only 64 days for irrigated wheat.” This leads
to two important implications.
First, whether opium is profitable (and more profitable than an alternative, e.g.,
wheat) depends on the price in the respective year and differs between districts, also
because it is costlier than wheat in terms of inputs like fertilizer. Mansfield and Fishstein
(2016) report that there were years where opium was profitable across nearly all locations
they examined, and other years where this depends on the specific location. This supports
5 Bove and Elia (2013, p. 538) even write that “in Afghanistan individuals may choose between opium
cultivation and joining an anti-government group.”
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our empirical strategy exploiting that price changes have heterogeneous effects depending
on the suitability of soil. Second, other crops are plausible alternatives when considering
the net returns. We take this into account by controlling for shocks on wheat profitability
in a similar manner as we do for opium. Due to the differences in labor intensity and legal
status, we expect different effects of both shocks. The effect of a positive wheat shock
on opportunity costs is ambiguous. While the income of some producers and farmers
increases, most farmers grow wheat as a staple crop and many households are net buyers
of wheat (Mansfield and Fishstein, 2016). The net effect on opportunity costs is hence a
combination of both a positive and a negative effect and thus remains an open empirical
question.
Studying the production process highlights one reasons why lower opium prices can
lead to more conflict. If opium becomes relatively less profitable compared to wheat, some
marginal (small or large) landowners will decide to switch to the less labor-intensive wheat
production. This will decrease the demand for labor. For those Afghans owning some
land, it means that they loose a potentially more lucrative alternative or complementary
source of income in addition to cultivating crops for subsistence. Tenant farmers and
cash-croppers do not even have this alternative or back-up option; for them joining anti-
government groups, who pay a minimal salary might be the only viable alternative.6
In Afghanistan, a further channel linking illegal crop production and conflict,
is producers turning to rebel groups which offer protection, against eradication or
expropriation, in exchange for some form of a taxation. According to a survey conducted
in southern Afghanistan, more than 65% of the farmers and traffickers stated that
protection of opium cultivation and of trafficking is the main opium-related activity of the
Taliban (Peters, 2009). UNODC (2013, p. 66) states that “[i]n some provinces, notably
those with a strong insurgent presence, some or all farmers reported paying an opium
tax” in the form of land or road taxes. If the Taliban were to use these revenues to expand
their battle activities, this could amplify conflict.7 Depending on whether the group acts
as stationary or roving bandits (De La Sierra, 2015), they could also establish monopolies
of violence to sustain taxation contracts and try to avoid conflict when the profitability
of the taxable resources is higher. Wright (2018) argues that the tactics of rebel groups
depend on their and the state’s capacity as well as on outside options available to civilians,
which can all be affected by income shocks. While rebel tactics are not the focus of our
study, we distinguish between different types of violence in a robustness test. Taken
together, a positive price shock on opium production could lead to less conflict through
6 Several sources speak of ten US Dollar per month as the wage offered by the
Taliban (more than in the official army), e.g., https://www.wired.com/2010/07/
taliban-pays-its-troops-better-than-karzai-pays-his/ and Afghan officials are cited as wanting
to turn “ten-dollar-Taliban” around (https://www.cleveland.com/world/index.ssf/2009/08/afghan_
leaders_move_toward_rec.html, accessed June 14, 2018).
7 See also http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-v-micallef/how-the-Taliban-gets-its_b_8551536.
html, accessed June 14, 2018.
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an opportunity cost channel or to more conflict via higher expected gains from fighting
and financing rebel activity.
B. Contributions to the literature
We contribute to different strands of the literature. First, we add to the large literature
on resource-related income shocks and conflict. Empirically, income is often found to be
one of the strongest correlates of violence (e.g., Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and
Hoeﬄer, 2004; Blattman and Miguel, 2010). Most recent studies exploit income shocks
induced by international commodity price changes or rainfall fluctuations that affect local
production and income levels, and can in turn also affect the level of conflict. However,
studies at the cross-country macro level (e.g., Miguel et al., 2004; Brückner and Ciccone,
2010; Bazzi and Blattman, 2014) and subnational level (e.g., Caselli and Michaels, 2013;
Dube and Vargas, 2013; Berman and Couttenier, 2015; Berman et al., 2017) are still far
from reaching a consensus. One plausible reason is that the majority of these papers do
not consider the different features of resources and income sources and the role of violent
group competition.8
Second, our analysis adds to the scarce causal evidence on the effect of illegal
commodities. Despite the importance of the illicit economy, in particular in many
developing and conflict-ridden societies, the literature provides very limited evidence
on the effects of illegal commodity shocks on conflict. One notable exception is Dell
(2015), who uses a regression discontinuity design to identify a causal relationship between
drug trafficking, the political approaches to cope with it, and drug-related violence at
the municipal level in Mexico. Our paper is similar to the extent that we also foster
the understanding of the causal effect of drug cultivation and related activities on the
behavior of people in affected regions. Closely related to our paper is the work by Angrist
and Kugler (2008) and Mejia and Restrepo (2015), who exploit demand and supply
shocks to cocaine and find a positive relationship with conflict in the Colombian context.
Mejia and Restrepo (2015) show that when cocaine production was estimated to be more
profitable the number of homicides increases. This effect is stronger in municipalities
with a high suitability to grow cocaine, while a higher profitability of alternative crops
such as cocoa, sugar cane, and palm oil tends to reduce violence. We augment these
findings by showing that it is not only labor intensity and illegality per se, but that
the nature of violent group competition over valuable resources moderates the resource-
8Ross (2004) and Lujala (2009) differentiate between various types of resources, but do not address
endogeneity. Ross (2004) analyses 13 cases and provides evidence on a relationship between oil, non-
fuel minerals, and drugs with conflict. Lujala (2009) finds a negative correlation of conflict with drug
cultivation, but suggests a conflict-increasing effect of gemstone mining and oil and gas. La Ferrara
and Guidolin (2007) analyze the effect of conflict on diamond production, i.e., the opposite direction
of causality. Gehring and Schneider (2016) show that oil shocks do not lead to violent conflict, but
their distribution can foster separatist party success in democracies.
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conflict-relationship. Additionally, we argue that illegality can matter if it is actually
enforced by the government, which can lead to conflict with the producers and create
support for cartels or rebel groups. With that said, we also contribute to the literature on
the provision of state-like institutions by non-state actors (e.g., De La Sierra, 2015). This
relates to problems of imposing rules upon occupied territory in general (Acemoglu et al.,
2011) and establishing a credible government in a poor and economically constrained
environment (Berman et al., 2011). Our results highlight the importance of distinguishing
between de jure illegality and de facto enforcement. In Afghanistan, our results support
anecdotal evidence that the government apparently takes a very loose stance on drug
enforcement outside areas directly surrounding Kabul. Our results also hint towards
the role of local Taliban groups as stationary bandits. Qualitative evidence emphasizes
that the Taliban collect taxes from opium farmers and traffickers and even implement
conflict-solving mechanisms within the districts under their control to minimize violence
that would potentially disturb the profitable production process. Our contribution thus
stresses the need to consider differences between the types of resources as well as local
circumstances like market structures before drawing general conclusions about the effect
of resources on conflict.
An important strand of literature emphasizes existing cleavages between ethnic groups
as an important driver of conflict (e.g., Esteban and Ray, 2008; Besley and Reynal-Querol,
2014; Morelli and Rohner, 2015; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2016). We argue that
since 2001 there is on average little competition between ethnic groups about suitable
districts in Afghanistan, because the conflict is between two major sides, and ethnic
groups and tribes have to choose to support one side or the other. This is supported
by the fact that our results do not differ between mixed and more or less ethnically
fractionalized districts.
We also add to the emerging literature on conflict and violence in Afghanistan.
For instance, Sexton (2016) uses plausibly random variation in the allocation of US
counterinsurgency aid to show that more aid leads to more conflict in contested districts.
In an experimental set up, Lyall et al. (2013) study the determinants of International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) support and show that harm caused by Western forces
increases support for the Taliban. Trebbi and Weese (2016) propose a new method
to study the internal organization of rebel groups in Afghanistan, supporting that the
Taliban are by far the most important group. Condra et al. (2018) show that the Taliban
try to undermine electoral institutions with attacks, but minimize direct harm to civilians.
In contrast, most of the conflicts we capture within our sample period are between rebels
and pro-government groups rather than against civilians.
Evidence on the relationship between opium and conflict is scarce, despite the fact
that opium accounts for the largest share of profits in Afghanistan (Felbab-Brown, 2013)
and, according to UNODC (2009), one out of seven Afghans is somehow involved in
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cultivation, processing or trafficking. Opium represents an important source of income
for at least 15% of Afghans, with a higher share in rural areas. Two studies address opium
production and conflict in Afghanistan empirically. Bove and Elia (2013) show a negative
correlation between conflict and opium prices for a sample of 15 out of 34 provinces and
monthly data over the 2004-2009 period. Our paper augments the findings in Bove and
Elia (2013) with a larger sample, longer time period and more systematic identification
strategies. Lind et al. (2014) find a negative impact of Western casualties on opium
production over the 2002-2007 period, and no effect in the opposite direction. Compared
to the focus on Western casualties we can provide a more comprehensive measurement of
conflict, and our different strategies allow us to carve out the direction of causality more
clearly.9 Our results seem to be at odds with Berman et al. (2011), who find no positive
correlation between unemployment and insurgency attacks for Afghanistan, Iraq and the
Philippines. The difference might be explained by their focus on the 2008-2009 period,
the use of other outcome variables and their reliance on a fixed effects strategy without
exogenous variation. Our findings based on household level data from the NRVA over the
2005-2012 period show that opium profitability coincides with households being better
off.
3. Data
Conflict data: We use the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) as our primary
source for different conflict indicators.10 This dataset includes geocoded information
(based on media reports) on the “best estimate of total fatalities resulting from an event”
(Sundberg and Melander, 2013; Croicu and Sundberg, 2015), with specific information
about the types of fighting (one-sided, state-based, non-state) and the actors involved as
illustrated in Table 9.11 In our sample period, 94% of the events covered by UCDP are
fights between the Afghan government and the Taliban (so-called state-based violence).
Less than 4% of all cases are classified as one-sided with the Taliban as the perpetrator
9As the ISAF “is not directly involved in the poppy eradication or destruction of processing facilities, or
in taking military action against narcotic producers” (see ISAF mandate: http://www.nato.int/isaf/
topics/mandate/index.html), the authors argue that Western casualties are more exogenous compared
to the total number of casualties. Nevertheless, the 2004 United Nations Security Council Resolution
1563, for instance indicates that Western forces were involved in eradication during the 2002-2007
period (see „extending central government authority to all parts of Afghanistan, [...], and of combating
narcotics trade and production”, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1563, accessed June 4,2018).
10We prefer this over data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), because
ACLED is only available for the 2004-2010 period, thus reducing the sample by half, and is reported
to be less reliable for Afghanistan (e.g., Eck, 2012).
11An event is defined as “[a]n incident where armed force was [used] by an organized actor against
another organized actor, or against civilians, resulting in at least 1 direct death at a specific location
and a specific date” (Sundberg and Melander, 2013; Croicu and Sundberg, 2015). These battle-related
deaths include dead civilians and deaths of persons of unknown status. For more details see Appendix
A.
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and civilians as the victims. We differentiate between these different types in Section 7.
Our analysis is at the district level (ADM2). There are 398 districts, which belong
to 34 provinces (ADM1) as presented in Figure 11 in Appendix C. There is no perfect
threshold in the casualty number that identifies a conflict as relevant.12 We report results
for thresholds of 5, 25, 50, and 100 battle-related deaths (BRD), and the log of the number
of BRD per district-year as a continuous conflict measure.13 Weidmann (2015) documents
some under-reporting of media-based conflict data in areas with low population density
compared to the SIGACTS data (Significant Activities), which are based on military
reports and not publicly available. Media-based datasets could also be downward biased
with regard to the intensity of conflict, especially in high conflict areas. Using different
thresholds, each somehow arbitrary, along with a continuous measure of BRD alleviates
these concerns, ensures transparency and allows us to capture conflict at the local level
in a comprehensive way. We also use population-weighted and unweighted suitabilities
to test potential differences with regard to population density, a jackknife approach (i.e.,
drop one province at a time) to account for the influence of high-conflict areas, and
consider different conflict types in robustness tests. None of this suggests that the choice
of conflict indicator introduces a systematic bias in our results.14 To further verify the
reliability of the UCDP GED data, Figure 23 in Appendix G shows a high correlation
with a subjective conflict indicator derived from the NRVA household survey.
Opium suitability index: We exploit a novel data set measuring the suitability
to grow opium based on exogenous underlying information about land cover, water
availability, climatic suitability, and soil suitability. Conceptually, the index is comparable
to suitability indices by the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). It was developed
in collaboration with UNODC, and is described in detail in a publication in a geographical
science journal (Kienberger et al., 2017). The left hand side of Figure 1 plots the
distribution of the opium suitability index across Afghan districts. While an index of
one would indicate perfect suitability in terms of land cover, water availability, climatic
suitability, and suitability of soils, an index of zero means that the district is least suitable
for growing opium. Given that it is generally possible to grow opium in many parts of
Afghanistan and that it is “renewable,” this suitability can also be understood as the
actual “resource” that varies across districts. We weigh the suitability with the population
12Although it is standard at the macro level to only use the two thresholds of 25 and 1000, the latter
threshold is evidently not appropriate for an analysis at the district level.
13 Berman and Couttenier (2015) use a one-BRD threshold. However, the grid cell level at which they
work is of a much smaller size than the ADM2 level. For our size, we consider five BRD a good
threshold to detect small conflict, whereas a one-BRD threshold might suffer from misreporting and
falsely coding conflict.
14We also use the SIGACTS data on the events direct fire, indirect fire, and improvised explosive device
(IED), for which we received access by Shaver and Wright (2016) to verify the reliability of UCDP
GED data. The results for all three types of events point in the same negative direction and are
available on request.
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density, but this does not affect our results.
Figure 1
Distribution of crop suitability across districts (weighted by population)
(a) Opium suitability (Kienberger et al., 2017) (b) Wheat suitability (FAO GAEZ )
Drug prices: For the measure of the external price shock we rely on international
drug price data from the European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction
(EMCDDA), which provides data for a large number of drugs in European countries
(also including Turkey that is crossed by many drug trafficking routes). We take the
mean prices for each country-year and calculate the average across all countries for which
data are available, in order to eliminate the effects of country-specific shocks. The average
variation should be a clearer estimate of global demand shocks.15 Local price data on
opium are derived from the annual Afghanistan Opium Price Monitoring reports by
UNODC. The international price is the price for heroin, which is an opiate derived from
morphines that are extracted from the opium poppy.16
Drug cultivation and drug revenues: Information on actual opium cultivation and
opium yield is retrieved from the annual UNODC Opium Survey reports. District level
cultivation are estimates derived from province level cultivation data from UNODC survey
questionnaires and remote sensing methods. We calculate actual opium production at the
district-year level from opium cultivation and the respective yields, which vary by year
and region. Opium revenues equal opium production in kg multiplied with the yearly
15 In the robustness section (Section 7), we try alternative definitions by taking price deviations from the
long-term mean. Our results are not affected by this choice.
16 EMCDDA provides data on white and brown heroin. The bulk of heroin consumed in Europe is brown
heroin, which is also much cheaper than white heroin. Besides being less common, white heroin is only
reported by a small number of European countries and is also likely to be consumed in fewer countries.
Both types are products of opium poppies and the correlation between white and brown heroin prices
is 0.49.
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Afghan farm-gate prices (fresh opium at harvest time, country-average) in constant 2010
Euro/kg. For the regression analysis we take the logarithm of the revenues.
Survey Data: We use the NRVA survey waves conducted in 2005, 2007/08 and 2011/12
(CSO, 2005, 2007/08, 2011/12) to better test the opportunity cost channel at the
household level. These are nationally representative and include between 21,000 and
31,000 households as well as covering from 341 to 388 of the 398 official districts in
Afghanistan. We harmonize data from three different waves to construct indicators based
on food consumption and expenditures, household assets, and a self-reported measure on
the household’s economic situation.
Other data: As covariates we take the average luminosity computed using nighttime
satellite data as a proxy for development (Henderson et al., 2012) and population
(Henderson et al., 2018), which is computed using estimates from the Gridded Population
of the World, Version 4 (GPWv4), dataset. Development and population are potentially
affected by our outcome variable conflict and thus potentially bad controls. Accordingly,
we take the (pre-determined) lagged values, and use them only for robustness. Using
district-fixed effects and only within-district variation ensures that our main estimations
are not affected by cross-sectional differences in population size. Similar to Harari and
La Ferrara (2018) we use an index that captures inter-annual variations in drought
conditions, the vegetation health index (VHI) provided by the FAO (Van Hoolst et al.,
2016). In contrast to precipitation data (which are of low quality in Afghanistan)
this requires no assumptions about the linearity of the effect and directly measures
drought conditions. Additional time-invariant data on geographic conditions and further
potentially relevant factors are used to identify mechanisms and for robustness tests. To
analyze heterogeneous effects, we georeferenced district level information about opium
production in labs, opium markets, and trafficking, as well as on military and government
presence that are explained in the respective sections (Sections 6 and 7). All variables
and their sources are described in detail in Appendix A and descriptive statistics are
reported in Appendix B.
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4. Identification strategy
A. Estimating equation and identification
Our baseline specification focuses on the reduced-form intention-to-treat (ITT) effect.
We prefer this specification because opium cultivation data are district level estimates by
UNODC derived from province level data that might exhibit considerable measurement
error.17 To circumvent these concerns we combine temporal price variation with district
level data on the suitability to grow opium to compute the reduced-form effect. In
addition, we use actual opium revenues (and cultivation) to assess the size of our effect
in an IV setting. This approach resembles Bartik- or shift-share-like instruments that
combine cross-sectional variation with variation in a times series (e.g., Nunn and Qian,
2014). Our baseline equation at the district-year level over the 2002 to 2014 period is:
conflictd,t = βopiumprofitabilityd,t−1 + ζwheat shockd,t−1 + τt + δd + τtδp + εd,t. (1)
Standard errors are clustered at the district level, but results are robust to different
choices including the use of province level clusters and a wild-cluster bootstrap approach
(Appendix F, Table 32). The outcome variable, conflictd,t, is the incidence or the
intensity of conflict in district d in year t based on the different thresholds. Our
“treatment” variable opiumprofitabilityd,t−1 measures the relative extent of the shock
induced by world market price changes in t-1 conditional on the exogenous district-specific
suitability to grow opium in district d. More specifically, opiumprofitabilityd,t−1, and
analogously wheat shockd,t−1, are defined as:
opiumprofitabilityd,t−1 = drug pricet−1 × opiumsuitabilityd,
wheat shockd,t−1 = wheat pricet−1 × wheat suitabilityd.
We include wheat-related income shocks (wheat shockd,t−1), since wheat is the main
(legal) alternative crop that farmers grow throughout Afghanistan. This allows us to
identify differential effects for two types of income shocks, one affecting the main legal
and the other the main illegal crop. Wheat shockd,t−1 uses variation in the international
wheat price interacted with the suitability to produce wheat (wheat suitabilityd). The
effect of wheat price shocks on income is ambiguous, as Afghanistan also imports large
amounts of wheat. In fact, Afghanistan contributes less than 1% to the global wheat
supply, which is why we follow the literature and consider the international price as
17As stated by the UNODC (2015, 63) “[d]istrict estimates are derived by a combination of different
approaches. They are indicative only, and suggest a possible distribution of the estimated provincial
poppy area among the districts of a province.” Assuming the measurement error is normal, this would
bias our estimations towards zero. In case the precision of estimates is also affected by conflict and
suitability, however, the bias is hard to predict.
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exogenous (e.g., Berman and Couttenier, 2015). Note, that our main results regarding
opiumprofitability all hold without including this variable.
Figure 2
Time structure of price effects
Market price changes can plausibly influence opium cultivation and revenues in the
same and the following year, as Figure 2 illustrates. There are two main growing seasons
for opium in Afghanistan, the winter season starting in fall and the summer season
starting around March (Mansfield and Fishstein, 2016). Our preferred specification
assumes the largest effect of opiumprofitability on conflict one year later. Price changes
in (t-1 ) are most likely to affect cultivation decisions in summer(t-1 ), winter(t-1/t)
and summer(t), as well as affecting labor demand and revenues in both (t-1 ) and (t).
Using prices in (t-1 ) accounts for the fact that producers require time to update their
information set and adjust production, and often receive their remuneration in advance
(Mansfield and Fishstein, 2016).18 Taking contemporaneous prices in (t) is conceptually
difficult with yearly price and conflict averages. Using the price in (t) would introduce
reverse causality, as price changes later in the year can be affected by conflict earlier in
the year. Moreover, it is unclear how quickly changes in world market prices transmit
into changes at the local Afghan level. For these reasons, we prefer the lagged value,
however, using prices in (t) yields comparable results as shown in Appendix E.
It might be problematic to use the international opium (heroin) price pOt−1 because
Afghanistan contributes a large share of the global opium production (UNODC, 2013b).
More specifically, we would be worried about omitted variables OVt−1 that affect both
opium production and pOt−1, as well as conflictd,t, differentially, conditional on the time-
invariant opiumsuitabilityd. Problematic omitted variables would be any time-varying
factors that affect high and low suitability districts differentially and follow a similar
pattern as the heroin price.
One example of such an omitted variable could be changes in district-specific
government institutions. Assuming that well-working government institutions are bad for
18 Caulkins et al. (2010, p. 9) also suggest that “the largest driver of changes in hectares under poppy
cultivation is not eradication or enforcement risk, but rather last year’s opium prices.”
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opium production and trafficking, the effect of better institutions on production would
be more negative in highly suitable regions. If good institutions also lead to less conflict,
omitting this variable would bias our estimated effect upwards. Note that as we find a
negative relationship we are more concerned about a potential downward bias. This could,
for instance, occur if endogenously decided eradication campaigns correlate positively
with the heroin price, and are less likely to take place in highly suitable areas that could
be more risky to enter for government forces. If eradication campaigns also cause conflict,
this would lead to a spurious correlation biasing the coefficient for opiumprofitabilityd,t−1
downwards. Based on the notorious ineffectiveness of eradication policies (see, Rubin
and Sherman, 2008; Felbab-Brown, 2013; Mejía et al., 2015), this possibility seems rather
unlikely, yet there could be other biasing factors.
Note that we are less worried about overall opium supply shocks in Afghanistan.
While these shocks would of course affect world market prices, this variation is captured
by year-fixed effects. The year-fixed effects τt capture, for instance, yearly changes in
crop diseases or shifts in anti-drug policies to the degree that they affect all districts
in Afghanistan in the same way. District-fixed effects δd account for time-invariant
unobservable characteristics at the district level. Province-times-year-fixed effects τtδp
account in addition for time-varying unobservables at the province level. These can
include institutions provided by ethnic group or tribal leaders or warlords, which are
in many provinces more important than the central government. As a large share of
the drug trade is organized at the ethnic or provincial level (Giustozzi, 2009), changes
in those institutions plausibly affect both conflict and opium production. Identification
in this setting then relies only on within-province variation in a particular year due to
differences in opium suitability.
Moreover, although our main specification does not rely on control variables,
Appendix F shows that the results also hold with using Xd,t and Xd,t−2, vectors of district
level time-varying covariates including climate conditions and some baseline covariates
frequently used in other conflict regressions such as luminosity (as a proxy for GDP) and
population. Climate conditions are exogenous to conflict and can plausibly be used as
contemporaneous values. We lag the luminosity and population twice with the aim to
use a pre-determined value and to mitigate the bad control problem.
Table 10 in Appendix B shows that low and high suitability differ in some covariates
Xd, as for instance in the distance to Kabul or ethnic group distribution. We would
be worried if time-varying omitted variables would affect opium prices and conflict
differentially depending on those covariates. A problematic case would be if high
suitability districts, for reasons unrelated to opium, experience an increase in conflict
over the sample period, and low suitability districts exhibit no change. The decrease
in prices would then on average be associated with increasing conflict in highly suitable
districts, even though it was caused by other characteristics that distinguish high from
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low suitability districts. By interacting the complete set of time-invariant covariates Xd
both with a linear time trend or flexibly with time-fixed effects τt, we capture any such
bias to the extent that it is based on those observable differences (see, Appendix F).
Next, we would be concerned if long term trends in prices correlate with long term
trends in conflict that are driven by omitted variables and differ between low and high
suitability districts. We thus take the issues raised in, e.g., Goldsmith-Pinkham et al.
(2018) and Barrett and Christian (2017) about the role of cross-sectional differences and
spurious non-linear trends very seriously. However, section D verifies that, even though
prices decline in early years as well, the trends only start to differ after an exogenous
change in Western policy around 2005, which increased the reliance of the local population
on opium revenues. Moreover, we alleviate this concern in different ways. First, Appendix
F shows the results with de-trended opium prices, which exhibit less variation but support
the main finding. Second, we randomize the prices across years and find that random
assignment yields to no significant relationship with coefficients being distributed around
zero. Third, section C examines price trends and suggests that long term trends are
mostly driven by demand rather than supply factors. Nonetheless, the next section
introduces an additional identification strategy exploiting the relationship of opium with
complement drugs to alleviate remaining concerns.
B. Identification using price changes
In order to assess the direction of any remaining potential bias, we gather price data
for a variety of drugs that are used as complements to heroin. We exploit the fact that
prices of complements depend on the same demand shifters (DS), but the biasing effect
of a district level change in opium supply qOt−1 (potentially caused by an omitted variable)
points in the opposite direction for the complement price than for the heroin price because
of the negative cross-price elasticity. More formally,
pOt−1 = f(
(+)
DS
′
t−1,
(−)
qOt−1,
(+)
qCt−1),
pCt−1 = f(
(+)
DS
′
t−1,
(+)
qOt−1,
(−)
qCt−1).
Accordingly, a bias resulting from problematic omitted variables that affect opium
supply would distort the estimated coefficient b in different directions for the opium and
complement prices. Formally, the expectations for a coefficient estimate from a regression
on conflict in the presence of a bias become:
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E[bO] = β + γ × ρ(opiumpricet−1 × suitd, OVt−1 × suitd)Var(opiumpricet−1 × suitd) , (2)
E[bC ] = β × σ
O
σC + σO
+ (−$)× γ × ρ(complement pricet−1 × suitd, OVt−1 × suitd)Var(complement pricet−1 × suitd) . (3)
bO and bC are the estimates using the opium and complement price, whereas β is the “true”
parameter. σO is the standard deviation of the opium price, and C indicates the influence
of exogenous supply side shocks on the complement price. $ is a parameter that is positive
if the cross-price elasticity is negative, i.e., if two goods are complements (−$) ≤ 0.
Hence, the equations show two things. Attenuation bias moves the complement estimate
towards zero, as σO
σC+σO
≤ 1. At the same time an omitted variable would bias the
complement coefficient in the opposite direction as compared to the opium coefficient.
Appendix D provides the derivation and explains the necessary assumptions.
We show that for this comparison to be helpful, three main criteria need to be fulfilled.
1. We need to be able to identify complements for which the negative cross-price
elasticity with opium is sufficiently high.
2. We require complements for which large supply side shocks are unrelated to district
level supply side shocks for opium in Afghanistan. This enables us to treat supply
side shocks as random noise (C), which does only attenuate the coefficient towards
zero.
3. The degree to which drug prices are affected by common demand shifters (a change
in overall income of consumers, a shift in consumers’ preferences about drugs, or
the number of buyers in the drug market) must be sufficiently high relative to C .
To the extent that these criteria are fulfilled, we can derive the following: If both estimates
have the same sign this strongly signals that the true effect also points in the same
direction due to the opposing directions of the omitted variable bias. If both exhibit a
negative coefficient, we can distinguish between two scenarios, a) a downward or b) an
upward bias in the opium estimate. In case a) the complement coefficient is more positive
than the opium coefficient, because both attenuation bias and OVB move it towards zero.
If the complement coefficient is more negative than the opium price, this suggests that
the opium coefficient is upward biased (scenario b). In this case, the opium estimate
can be interpreted as an upper bound of the true negative effect. Although the intuition
is provided in Equations 2 and 3, we also validate this strategy using a Monte Carlo
simulation, described in detail in Appendix D.
Regarding the identification of complements, we exploit the fact that drugs are
classified as stimulants (uppers) or depressants (downers), with heroin being in the latter
19
category. There is a consensus among experts about a high share of polydrug users, in
particular users that combine a stimulant and a depressant (EMCDDA, 2016). We gather
data on changes in the prices of three depressants that are regarded as complements to
opium: cocaine, amphetamine, and ecstasy (EMCDDA, 2016). Leri et al. (2003, p. 8)
conclude that the “prevalence of cocaine use among heroin addicts not in treatment ranges
from 30% to 80%,” making it a “strong” complement. This can take place in form of
“speed-balling” (mixing heroin and cocaine), consuming the two jointly or with a time
lag (e.g., weekend versus workday drug consumption). Moreover, cocaine supply is also
most clearly exogenous to supply shocks in Afghanistan, as production exclusively takes
place in South America and there is nearly no overlap with regard to trafficking routes
(suggested by low cocaine seizures in Asia, see, UNODC, 2013b).19 Thus, cocaine most
clearly fulfills conditions 1 and 2.
One disadvantage of focusing on one complement is that supply side shocks for any
individual complement C could have a relatively large influence compared to common
demands shifters. Using an index of the average normalized prices of the three upper
drugs instead has the advantage of reducing the influence of individual supply side shocks,
making it more likely that condition 3 is fulfilled. Hence, we use the cocaine price alone as
well as a complement index. We find comparable results using either the cocaine price or
the index. We will also argue that the movement of prices (and expert opinions) indicate
that long term price changes are more strongly driven by demand-side factors, which also
alleviates concerns about omitted variables and their suitability-specific effect on opium
supply and prices.20
C. International prices, local prices, and local revenues
In the following, we (i) discuss the movements of prices over our sample period, (ii)
show that international prices of complements correlate positively with the international
heroin price, (iii) international prices translate into economically relevant changes in the
local price in Afghanistan and, (iv) that they affect opium revenues at the district level in
Afghanistan. Figure 3 displays the variation in the international prices of heroin, cocaine,
the complement index, as well as the Afghan price in constant 2010 Euro per gram. The
local opium farm-gate prices at harvest time in Afghanistan are the ones most likely to
be driven by opium supply side effects in Afghanistan. The international heroin price is a
19 There is also no evidence suggesting that ecstasy and amphetamines are produced in Afghanistan,
but there is vague evidence on amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) being seized in the Middle East
(UNODC, 2013b). Afghanistan is never mentioned in this regard and not included in the list of
countries of provenance (UNODC, 2013b).
20 The price of substitutes can also be positively correlated with the opium price as both prices increase
if general demand, preferences or the number of buyers increases. However, when opium supply
decreases, the opium price would increase and the price of the substitute would also increase. Hence,
we cannot distinguish the demand shock from the second, potentially endogenous, relationship with
Afghan opium supply, as both point in the same direction.
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result of demand and supply in both the world market and within Afghanistan. Finally,
the complement index captures shifts in demand for the three complementary drugs and
largely eliminates individual supply shocks by using the average.
The graph provides several important insights. First, there are variations between
the years, but overall all prices decline over time. The common pattern suggests that
on average the development of prices over time is more strongly driven by common
demand factors, and not by a shock to an individual drug. Interviews with experts at
EMCDDA also support this view. Second, there is an overall positive correlation between
the international heroin price, the complement index and the cocaine price (significant
at the 1% level), validating our assumption of the cross-price elasticity being sufficiently
high. As expected, the index exhibits less variation than the cocaine price. Third,
local Afghan prices also correlate positively with the international heroin price. This
indicates that despite end-customer market prices being multitudes higher than local
prices, international price changes also translate into economically meaningful changes at
the country of origin.
Figure 3
Variation in international and local prices over time
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After showing that the international heroin price is positively correlated with the
international complement price index and with the local opium price, we proceed
and quantitatively test whether international price changes translate into changes in
actual opium revenues at the district level.21 Some reports indicate that an amount of
opium worth 600 US Dollar can have a street value of more than 150,000 US Dollar.22
Consequently, we want to see whether market consumer price changes have a statistically
and economically significant effect at the local level. We therefore run the empirical
model as defined in Equation 1 but with the actual revenues from opium cultivation as
the dependent variable (in logarithms). Opium revenues are defined as the production in
21 In Appendix F in Table 26 we replace revenues with opium cultivation in hectares.
22 See http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/afghanistan-the-making-of-a-narco-state-20141204,
accessed June 14, 2018.
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kg multiplied with the Afghan opium farm-gate price at harvest in constant 2010 EU/kg.
Table 1 presents the results considering lagged effects in column 1. In column 2 we
consider both lagged and contemporaneous effects by taking the moving average over (t)
and (t-1).
Table 1
Effect of international price changes on opium revenues, 2002-2014
Outcome: (t) Outcome: (t) + (t-1)
(1) (2)
Opium Profitability (t-1) 2.336*** 2.489***
(0.827) (0.749)
Wheat Shock (t-1) -0.406 -0.123
(0.460) (0.418)
Number of observations 5149 5085
Adjusted R-Squared 0.482 0.565
Notes: The dependent variable opium revenues is in logarithms. Column 1 presents lagged effects.
Column 2 reports lagged and contemporaneous effects by defining the outcome as the moving
average, i.e., (revenues(t)+revenues(t-1))/2. Opium Profitability is defined as the interaction
between the normalized international heroin drug price (in logarithms) and the suitability to grow
opium. Standard errors clustered at the district level are displayed in parentheses. Significance
levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01.
We see that external price shocks, measured by the interaction of international heroin
price with the suitability to grow opium, in line with our proposed mechanism lead to an
increase in local opium revenues in the same and following year (compared to Figure 2).
These results are significant at the 1% level in columns 1 and 2. Quantitatively, a 1%
increase in the international heroin price leads to about a 2.4% increase in revenues for
those districts where opium suitability reaches one (perfect suitability). For districts
characterized by the mean suitability (0.53) the effect would roughly decrease by half
(0.53*2.40=1.27), but the elasticity is still bigger than one.23 As a placebo test, it is
reassuring that despite a positive correlation in the two suitability indices, the wheat
shock has no effect on opium revenues.
D. Visualizing the identification strategy
As our identification relies on the interaction term opiumprofitabilityd,t−1 =
drugpricet−1×suitabilityd, our setting resembles a difference-in-difference approach. The
main effects of the two levels of the interaction term (drug pricet−1, opiumsuitabilityd)
are captured by the district- and time-fixed effects in our model. We expect the effect of
international price shocks on opium cultivation and revenue to be larger in districts that
23 This estimation does not include province-times-year-fixed effects as the actual cultivation data, from
which revenues are calculated, is gathered at the province level and district level data are estimated
based on these underlying data (like any other estimation using cultivation data).
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are more suitable to grow opium compared to districts with a low suitability. Figure 4
illustrates this with two maps showing the district level opium suitability overlaid with the
distribution of conflict across Afghanistan for two selected years. 2004 is (and follows) a
year of high prices and thus higher opium profitability (left graph) and 2009 a year of lower
prices (right graph). It becomes immediately clear that lower prices are associated with
more widespread and more intense conflict, and higher prices with less conflict, indicating
support for the opportunity cost hypothesis at the country level. Our identification,
however, relies on within-district variation over time conditional on suitability. This
intuition becomes clear when comparing the relative change in conflict for different levels
of opium suitability. Districts with a higher suitability experience a much higher increase
in conflict when prices and opium profitability decline. This is most evident in the north,
northeast, and east. Although these are only correlations, they help to understand the
variation that we exploit in our analysis in the next section.
Figure 4
Intensity of conflict in districts with high and low opium suitability
(a) Conflict (2004): High opium prices (t/t-1) (b) Conflict (2009): Low opium prices (t/t-1)
5. Results
A. Main results
We now turn to our main results in Table 2. We report results for different dependent
variables, where column 1 uses the continuous measure (log BRD) and columns 2 to 5
define conflict as a binary indicator with increasing thresholds of battle-related deaths.
Panel A reports results using the interaction of the local opium price with the suitability
to grow opium as the measure for opium profitability. In panel B we replace the local
price with the international heroin price (our baseline specification), and panel C and
D report results using the complement price index and for robustness the international
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cocaine price. All regressions include only wheat shock and province-times-year-fixed
effects as control variables. Our results do not rely on the inclusion of control variables
as can be seen in Appendix F, where we show that inferences are robust across various
different specifications. Turning to the results, the regression coefficients are very much in
line with our graphical inspection in Figure 4. Already when using the local opium prices,
which introduces endogeneity, we find constantly negative coefficients. When turning to
our baseline specification in panel B, the negative effect of the opium profitability on
conflict intensity and incidence is more pronounced than in panel A. The coefficients are
significant at the 5% to 10% level for the first four specifications. They turn insignificant
when considering only conflict events with more than 100 deaths, which is what we expect
given the low number of such high scale events and the higher degree of state dependence.
A 10% increase in the international heroin price translates into 7% fewer battle-related
deaths in perfectly suitable districts. Note that a price increase of 10% is only slightly
above the average annual price change of 8.8%.
To verify whether this negative effect can be causally interpreted, we now turn to
the results using our complement prices. In panels C and D we find that the point
estimates using the complement price index and the cocaine price are both negative. The
fact that both estimates are negative reassures us that the true effect is also negative.
Furthermore, the fact that the estimates using the complement prices are more negative
– and statistically significant at the 1% level in columns 1 to 4 – indicates that the
coefficients using the heroin price are (marginally) upward biased and provide an upper
bound of the true negative effect. Accordingly, the true effect might be more negative
than the coefficients using the heroin price. For all further computations we proceed with
this more “conservative” specification.
When turning to the main legal alternative crop – wheat – we observe a positive
coefficient in most regressions. Though, contrary to opium price-related shocks, the
point estimates of wheat price-related shocks sometimes switch signs and turn negative.
Bearing in mind that contrary to opium, wheat is relatively less labor intensive and
often also imported from abroad. The fact that most households are net buyers of wheat
(Mansfield and Fishstein, 2016) and are thus negatively affected by price increases could
explain the positive coefficients.24
24 Chabot and Dorosh (2007) use the NRVA household survey and state that in the 2003 wave calorie
intake through wheat consumption amounts to 60% of total calorie consumption pointing to the high
reliance on this crop.
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Table 2
Main results using normalized drug prices, 2002-2014
(log) BRD 1 if ≥ 5 1 if ≥ 10 1 if ≥ 25 1 if ≥ 100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Local Opium Price
Opium Profitability (t-1) -0.346*** -0.096*** -0.094*** -0.076** -0.042**
(0.107) (0.033) (0.032) (0.029) (0.018)
Wheat Shock (t-1) 0.366*** 0.100*** 0.095*** 0.047 -0.013
(0.120) (0.037) (0.035) (0.031) (0.017)
Number of observations 5174 5174 5174 5174 5174
Adjusted R-Squared 0.649 0.502 0.484 0.454 0.311
Panel B: International Heroin Price (Baseline)
Opium Profitability (t-1) -0.675** -0.167* -0.191** -0.147* -0.040
(0.296) (0.090) (0.085) (0.075) (0.037)
Wheat Shock (t-1) 0.307** 0.088** 0.077** 0.034 -0.010
(0.123) (0.039) (0.036) (0.031) (0.019)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.649 0.501 0.484 0.454 0.310
Panel C: International Complement Price
Opium Profitability (t-1) -0.947*** -0.249*** -0.237*** -0.203*** -0.086**
(0.308) (0.094) (0.086) (0.076) (0.041)
Wheat Shock (t-1) 0.221* 0.063 0.060 0.016 -0.023
(0.128) (0.040) (0.037) (0.033) (0.020)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.651 0.502 0.484 0.455 0.311
Panel D: International Cocaine Price
Opium Profitability (t-1) -0.461** -0.116* -0.124** -0.102** -0.026
(0.199) (0.059) (0.057) (0.051) (0.025)
Wheat Shock (t-1) 0.305** 0.087** 0.078** 0.033 -0.010
(0.120) (0.038) (0.035) (0.030) (0.018)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.650 0.502 0.484 0.454 0.310
Notes: Linear probability models with province-times-year- and district-fixed effects. The dependent
variable is conflict in (t) operationalized as indicated in the column heading. Opium Profitability is
defined as the interaction between the normalized drug prices (in logarithms) and the suitability to
grow opium. The number of observations is equal across all panels (5174). Standard errors are in
parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01.
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B. Instrumental variable
In a next step, we use IV regressions, where we instrument the endogenous variable
(opium revenues) with two different IVs, opium profitability and a measure for climate
conditions, the vegetation health index (VHI) (similar to Miguel et al., 2004; Nillesen and
Verwimp, 2009). While the reduced form approach in Table 2 presents the ITT effect, we
identify the LATE for compliers in Table 3. Having an alternative source of exogenous
variation enables us to compare the LATE of the different instrumental variables. This
step also allows us to quantify the size of the effect in an economically meaningful way.
Note that we still prefer the reduced form results presented in Table 2, as the data on
opium cultivation and thus revenues are estimates only and there might be non-random
measurement error in the data. As in Table 1, we do not include province-times-year-fixed
effects as district level opium revenue data are estimates from province level data.
Panel A of Table 3 reports second stage IV results where we instrument opium
revenues with opium profitability measured by the interaction of the international heroin
price with the suitability to grow opium. We find a negative coefficient for opium revenues
in all columns in panel A, significant at the 10% level in columns 1 and 2 as well as close
to significance at conventional levels in column 3. The IV results reveal that the opium
profitability is a strong instrument as indicated by the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic, which
clearly exceeds the critical threshold of ten proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997). Parallel
to panel A, we instrument opium revenues with the VHI in panel B and find our results
to remain robust. In particular for columns 1 to 3 coefficient estimates are very close
across both panels, indicating that the LATEs are very similar. In panel C we use both
instruments jointly and again find quantitatively comparable effects. Results turn out
to be significant in columns 1 to 4. The three estimates reported in column 1 across all
panels show that an increase of opium revenues by 10% leads to a decrease in the number
of battle-related deaths of about 2%.
The last specification with two instruments allows us to conduct an overidentification
test, which helps to assess the validity of the instruments. The Hansen over-identification
test-statistics support the validity of the instruments in all columns. Panel D presents
corresponding first stage results. While opium profitability positively affects opium
revenues as we already know from Table 1, the VHI negatively affects revenues, which is
reasonable as droughts deteriorate cultivaton and yield of opium.
To sum up, we get very similar results using two rather different sources of exogenous
variation. This is reassuring regarding the quantitative size of the IV estimates, as well
as for the validity of our main identification strategy. What is more, in Appendix F we
show that this finding holds when using a further IV, which is based on changes in legal
opioid prescription in the United States (Table 30). Different combinations of the three
instruments point to very similar results. We also show IV results for a different timing
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and for opium cultivation in Appendix F.
Table 3
First and second stage IV results for opium revenue (t-1), 2002-2014
(log) BRD 1 if ≥ 5 1 if ≥ 10 1 if ≥ 25 1 if ≥ 100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Opium Profitability (t-1) as IV
(log) Revenue (t-1) -0.153* -0.044* -0.040 -0.018 -0.004
(0.083) (0.025) (0.025) (0.019) (0.008)
Number of observations 5104 5104 5104 5104 5104
Kleibergen-Paap F stat. 16.382 16.382 16.382 16.382 16.382
Panel B: VHI (t-1) as IV
(log) Revenue (t-1) -0.184* -0.049 -0.049 -0.052* -0.016
(0.107) (0.032) (0.031) (0.027) (0.014)
Kleibergen-Paap F stat. 9.634 9.634 9.634 9.634 9.634
Panel C: Opium Profitability & VHI (t-1) as IV
(log) Revenue (t-1) -0.162** -0.045** -0.042** -0.027* -0.007
(0.071) (0.021) (0.021) (0.016) (0.008)
Kleibergen-Paap F stat. 11.753 11.753 11.753 11.753 11.753
Hansen J p-val. 0.800 0.896 0.806 0.226 0.371
Panel D: First stage results
Panel Panel Panel
A B C
Opium Profitability (t-1) 2.922*** 2.798***
(0.722) (0.721)
VHI (t-1) -0.013*** -0.012***
(0.004) (0.004)
Notes: Linear probability models with year- and district-fixed effects. The dependent variable is
conflict in (t) operationalized as indicated in the column heading. Opium profitability is defined as
the interaction between the normalized international heroin prices (in logarithms) and the suitability
to grow opium. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels:
* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01.
Taken together, we find that opium profitability is an important determinant of
conflict incidence and intensity in the ITT and IV estimation. Our findings are in line
with the results for positive income shocks in Berman and Couttenier (2015) and they
support the conclusions in Dube and Vargas (2013) that the labor intensity of a resource
compared to alternatives is a decisive factor. However, our results seem to be at odds with
the conclusion in Mejia and Restrepo (2015) that an income shock for an illegal resource
is related to more conflict. While coca has a similar labor intensity as the alternative
crops cacao, palm oil, and sugar cane in Colombia (Mejia and Restrepo, 2015), opium
cultivation is much more labor-intensive than all alternative crops. The next section will
further elaborate on the role of local monopolies of violence and the absence of group
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competition as potential explanations for the differences, suggesting that illegality per
se is not the decisive factor moderating the effect on conflict. We will also dig deeper
into identifying whether the effect is driven by increased opportunity costs of fighting by
looking at household level survey data.
6. Mechanisms and transmission channels
A. Opportunity costs at the household level
Whereas the tests above provide an indication of the potential profits in a particular
district, a second important question is to what degree individual households and farmers
actually benefit from a higher opium profitability. To exploit this individual dimension
we use different waves of an Afghan nationally-representative household survey, the
National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA). We construct several indicators of
households’ living standards, in accordance with the literature. This allows us to analyze
whether opium profitability translates into better living standards, which would provide
evidence for the opportunity cost hypothesis. Figure 5 plots the coefficients for opium
profitability for seven different regression models with the outcome variable indicated
in the legends. We find evidence that the dietary diversity increases when households
experience a positive opium profitability and that more households are food secure. The
positive effect of a higher profitability of opium is also visible when we consider food
expenditures.25
We turn to indicators that are not as volatile as food consumption. In years following
high opium prices, households in districts with a higher opium suitability benefit more
from the price increases also in terms of assets that they hold. The last indicator
“Economically Improved” is a self-reported measure, which turns out to be affected in
the same direction as the other indicators of living standards. If households are better off
economically, there is less need to fight as the opportunity costs of fighting do indeed
increase with a higher opium profitability. The corresponding regression results are
presented in Table 18.26 In line with our main findings at the district level and our
hypothesized mechanisms, the household level opportunity costs of fighting increase with
a higher opium profitability. We do not think it is feasible to distinguish whether factors
at the household or group level are more important. Rather we provide support for
mechanisms at both levels.
25We also construct food expenditure adjusted for spatial price differences using the Paasche or Laspeyres
price indexes, since households in different districts face different prices. Results are robust to this
choice as can be seen in Table 18.
26Results are also robust when accounting for household survey weights as presented in Figure 14.
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Figure 5
Effect of opium profitability (t-1) on living standard indicators in year (t)
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B. Opportunity costs and group competition at the district
level
If there was competition among producers (between cartels or rival groups), we would
expect that in districts which feature not only raw production but also intermediate
steps along the value-chain (like processing, trading or trafficking), rents associated with
opium and thus the gains from fighting are higher. In line with contest theory, the
conflict-decreasing effect of positive income shocks would be relatively smaller in these
districts. In contrast, if there was no or little violent group competition, higher profits
would increase the opportunity costs of fighting even more in those districts that can
extract a larger share of the value added. To be able to test this formally, we require
proxies for the potential share of value added per district.
For this endeavor, we georeference data on whether a district contains a heroin or
morphine lab, an opium market (major or sub-market) or whether it is crossed by
potential drug trafficking routes. Figure 6 shows some of the data, and Appendices
A and H provide all sources. The information is to a large extent based on UNODC
reports. Profit margins are higher further up the production chain, markets create
additional jobs and revenue, and trafficking routes allow raising income through some
form of taxation or road charges. While it is important to keep in mind that there is no
reliable information about yearly changes in trafficking routes and opium markets or labs,
it is more precise to think of these variables as proxies. Nevertheless, we find it plausible
that with little eradication efforts and limited state capacity, most of the locations and
trafficking routes would remain relevant throughout the sample period. In particular, we
create four indicators measuring the existence or sum of markets and processing labs in
a district and whether a district is on a plausible trafficking route that would not need
to cross areas of other ethnic groups.
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As a second group of measures, we proxy for the role and connectivity of a district
in the whole drug production and trafficking network using a market access approach
adapted from Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016). The assumption is that in addition to
capturing a larger share of value added, when a district itself features more markets, being
surrounded by other districts with many markets increases the district’s probability to
extract rents (i) when transporting the raw product to markets, (ii) processing it in
laboratories, and (iii) when trafficking the final product out of the country. This measure
takes account of production chains and the interconnectedness of the production network,
which should provide a more precise measure of potential profit opportunities and
extractable rents related to the opium economy. We also compute more common market
access variables using economic development (or population) as proxies for the economic
importance of districts as consumer markets. As the importance of Afghan consumers for
opium-related profits is negligible, a significant interaction with these placebo measures
could indicate that our drug market access captures a spurious relationship and not
meaningful variation in the share of extractable rents from the opium economy. Market
access for a district i is computed as MAi =
∑N
j=1 dist
−θ
i,jWj. Wj is the importance
of district j proxied using either the number of drug markets or mean luminosity (or
population). disti,j are the distances between the district and the other districts and θ
is the factor discounting other districts that are further way. We use a factor of 1 as in
Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016). To take account of the topography and mountainous
terrain in Afghanistan, we compute distances using the two-dimensional road network
(Market Access 2D) as well as a three-dimensional road network when adjusting for
elevation (Market Access 3D).
Table 4 begins with considering interactions with variables that signal if a district is
able to extract more or less of the value-added along the production chain. The results in
panel A indicate that the link between the profitability of opium production and conflict is
more pronounced in districts that account for a potentially larger share of the value chain.
This is visible in the negative interaction effects for all four indicators. All coefficients are
negative, and with the exception of the indicator focusing only on laboratories significant
at the 5% or 1% level. Panel B presents interaction results using the market access
measures. In line with our hypothesis, we find a negative interaction effect when using
the proxy computed specifically for the drug market, but no relationship when computing
the indicator based on luminosity as a proxy for general economic development. Although
the measures employed might contain measurement error, the consistent results across all
indicators suggest that the conflict-reducing effect is driven by opportunity costs. It also
further suggests that there is no large scale violent group competition about the most
profitable districts.
There are at least two possible explanations. First, if the producers are at the same
time the local leaders of a rebel group (the Taliban) they are facing a trade-off between
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Figure 6
Mechanisms and channels
(a) Market access using opium markets (b) Ethnicities, military & Taliban (1996)
Notes: On the left hand side, the dots indicate district-specific centroids, and the black lines are
the shortest road connections to the other centroids in the network. To compute market access,
the same computation is done for every centroid in the district, leading to different optimal road
connections. The distances are then used as weights and multiplied with the importance of the
respective network members, in this case the number of drug markets. Sources: UNODC (2016),
Open Street Map and Afghanistan Information Management Service (AIMS).
The right hand side map shows the four major ethnic groups in Afghanistan (Source: GREG). The
white symbols with the black dots indicate the location of a foreign military base, for which we
could track location, opening and closing date (sources in detail in Appendices A and H.). The area
south of the thick black line was controlled by the Taliban prior to 2001 (Dorronsoro, 2005).
the gains from opium production and the gains from fighting the Afghan government or
Western forces. Fighting or attacks in the same district are harmful for production by
impeding works in the field, destroying production sites or drawing attention and thus
increasing the likelihood of eradication measures. All else equal, a higher profitability
of opium production relatively increases the incentives to maintain peace (or at least
some form of truce). Second, the fact that these districts cover additional steps in the
production chain also means that more workers benefit from the increases in profitability,
either through more jobs or higher wages, leading to a larger increase in opportunity costs
of fighting (respectively decrease when the price drops).
C. Mechanisms at the group level
The existing qualitative academic literature as well as reports, newspaper articles, and
our previous results suggest no large scale (violent) competition amongst suppliers in
Afghanistan.27 Areas and the respective drug production as well as the trafficking process
are either controlled by the Taliban and the local elites cooperating with them, or by the
(internationally recognized) government, the Western forces and other groups associated
27Note that this does not mean there is no competition at the small-scale level between individual farmers
and sharecroppers. What is important is that there is a local (district or province level) elite that has
established control over the district.
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Table 4
Opportunity costs proxied by share of value added, 2002-2014
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Opium Markets, Labs, Smuggling
Major/Sub Sum of All Any Ethnic
Market Markets Lab Traff. Route
Opium Profitability (t-1) -0.472 -0.480 -0.590* 0.105
(0.314) (0.306) (0.312) (0.358)
Opium Prof. (t-1)*X -0.845** -0.521** -0.502 -1.734***
(0.415) (0.255) (0.557) (0.487)
Panel B: Market Access (Network Approach)
Opium Market Luminosity
2D 3D 2D 3D
Opium Profitability (t-1) 1.489 1.496 -0.902** -0.899**
(1.140) (1.130) (0.434) (0.433)
Opium Prof. (t-1)*X -0.470** -0.474** 0.035 0.035
(0.232) (0.231) (0.041) (0.041)
Notes: Linear probability models with province-times-year- and district-fixed effects. The dependent
variable is the log of battle-related deaths in (t). Opium Profitability is defined as the interaction
between the normalized international heroin prices (in logarithms) and the suitability to grow opium.
Opium Market 2D and 3D range between [2.24,11.23] and [2.21,11.22], so the marginal effects are
always negative as well. Regressions include interactions of the opium profitability with a variable
X as indicated in in the column heading. For definitions of the variables X see Appendix A. The
number of observations is 5174 in every regression, the adjusted R-squared varies between 0.649 and
0.652. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10
** 0.05 *** 0.01
with it. We hypothesize that the degree of violent supplier (group) competition is decisive
in moderating the relationship between resource profitability and instability. This also
helps explain why our results point in the opposite direction than those from Angrist and
Kugler (2008) and Mejia and Restrepo (2015) in the Colombian setting. Rather than the
de jure legal status in its own right (as suggested in Mejia and Restrepo, 2015), local
monopolies of violence and the actual enforcement of the law matter.
There are no reliable time-varying data about Taliban-dominated territory or actual
government or Western military control for our whole sample period. Nevertheless, using
a variable estimating contemporaneous group control would be endogenous anyway, and
thus be problematic as part of an interaction term. We thus prefer to rely on time-
invariant and pre-determined variation prior to the start of our sample period. To
approximate the strength of government institutions and the presence of Western military
(and law enforcement), we compute distances to the seat of government and assemble
information about foreign military bases. Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2014) also
use distance as a measure of government influence, and Lind et al. (2014) uses distance
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to Kabul as an indicator for low law enforcement and weak state institutions.
In order to proxy for Taliban control, we also gather information on whether Pashtuns,
one of Afghanistan’s major ethnic groups, are present in a district (using data from
Weidmann et al., 2010), and whether the district has been controlled by the Taliban in
1996 (Dorronsoro, 2005). In both types of districts, government influence is potentially
less strong. Trebbi and Weese (2016, p. 5) argue that support for the Taliban as the main
insurgent group is best explained by ethnic boundaries. Anecdotal evidence and personal
conversations with experts indicate that ethnic institutions are more relevant compared
to the official government in Pashtun areas. For areas under Taliban control before 1996,
we expect that due to the common past the Taliban will, all else equal, find it easier to
expand their power again in those areas. We use a variety of different sources for these
variables, ranging from maps provided by experts at the UN, to American military data,
satellite images and newspaper reports. Figure 6 visualizes the data, and Appendix H
documents the steps involved in the construction and all sources in detail.
In uncontested districts, the Taliban also have higher incentives to maintain peace
to avoid distorting the production process, the more so the higher the profitability of
production. A local farmer describes that in a prominent opium growing area “the Taliban
have a court there to resolve people’s problems” and despite their presence “the security
situation is good for the people living there.”28 Other sources verify the link between
the Taliban and the drug production process, sometimes even providing seeds, tools and
fertilizer. A local Taliban leader is described as “just one of dozens of senior Taliban
leaders who are so enmeshed in the drug trade.”29 In contrast to other countries, there
is no strong competing producer or trafficker group. It is rather the case that “the drug
cartel is the Taliban.”30 Trebbi and Weese (2016, p. 5) also suggest that “insurgent
activity in Afghanistan is best represented by a single organized group.”
Drug producers apparently have little to fear from the government. Researchers
describing their fieldwork in Badakhshan “observed neither restrictions to poppy farmers
nor any repercussions or a need to hide the fields from outsiders” and in areas supposedly
controlled by the government, “officials at all levels are benefiting from the proceeds from
drug trafficking” (Kreutzmann, 2007, p. 616). Despite the official government claims that
“poppy cultivation only takes place in areas controlled by the Taliban,” a US counter-
narcotics official in Afghanistan reports that “(president) Karzai had Taliban enemies
who profited from drugs, but he had even more supporters who did.”31 This suggests
28 See http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/afghanistan-the-making-of-a-narco-state-20141204,
accessed June 14, 2018.
29 See https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/29/world/asia/opium-heroin-afghanistan-taliban.html and
https://thediplomat.com/2016/10/how-opium-fuels-the-talibans-war-machine-in-afghanistan/, both
accessed June 14, 2018.
30 See, https://qz.com/859268/americas-failed-war-on-drugs-in-afghanistan-is-threatening-to-doom-its-
war-on-terror-as-well/, accessed June 14, 2018.
31 See, http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/afghanistan-the-making-of-a-narco-state-20141204,
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that the Taliban have an active interest in an undisturbed drug production process, and
that the government has little power or interest to engage in the enforcement against the
de jure illegal production.
Table 5, panel A shows that the conflict-reducing effect is actually stronger in districts
that are more likely to be under Taliban control (columns 1-3). Columns 4 and 5 suggest
that whether a district is ethnically mixed or features a large number of ethnic groups
does not influence the relationship between opium and conflict.32 This is also the case
when we consider districts that in 1996 were partly controlled by the Taliban and partly
under the control of a member group of the Northern Alliance (column 6). Panel B shows
results for interactions with military bases, and several approximations for government
influence using the distance to Kabul. None of the interaction coefficients in panel B
turns out to be significant. That we also find no significant effect for any of the distance
measures could be due to the fact that the relation is not linear. In Table 6 we dig deeper
into the influence of the government by constructing binary indicators for whether a
district is within a specific proximity to Kabul or other main cities. This suggests that
the influence of the Afghan government seems indeed to be confined to districts within a
small radius of 75 km or approximately two hours driving distance to Kabul.
Our results do not rule out that local Taliban forces use part of the revenue extracted
from the opium business to finance anti-government conflict and attacks. Local revenues
could partly be used for violent operations if there are relevant targets within a district.
Of course, revenues need not fully remain within the district, and could be pooled to
enable countrywide operations. Figure 7 does not indicate such a mechanism at the large
scale. On average, an increase in opium revenue correlates with a decrease in casualties.
We also show a regression aggregating all our data at the provincial level and again find
a negative coefficient for opium profitability (see, Table 17). We would have expected the
opposite pattern if higher revenues in one district shifted conflict to neighboring districts
or to other provinces in the country.
accessed June 14, 2018. The same source also reports a case where a drug trafficker possessed a
letter of safe passage from a counter-narcotics police leader, and a new director of an anti-corruption
agency was revealed to be a formerly convicted drug trafficker.
32 In Appendix F we reconstruct measures on ethnic groups and in particular presence of Pashtuns by
relying on the NRVA 2003 household survey. While the 2003 wave is likely not to be nationally
representative, it serves as a suitable proxy to using the GREG dataset. Results are robust to relying
on household level information of native languages (see, Table 38).
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Table 5
Territorial control and ethnic groups, 2002-2014
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Taliban control & ethnic groups
Pashtuns Taliban Territory 1996 Ethnic Groups Mixed
All Regions No North 1 if Mixed Number Territory 1996
Opium Profitability (t-1) 0.312 -0.207 -0.221 -0.763** -0.695** -0.977*
(0.365) (0.372) (0.365) (0.370) (0.298) (0.568)
Opium Prof. (t-1)*X -1.723*** -1.013** -1.063** 0.130 -0.265 0.114
(0.412) (0.477) (0.491) (0.421) (0.977) (0.280)
Panel B: Presence of government & Western forces
Any Military Distance to Kabul Travel Time to Kabul
Base Linear Road 2D Road 3D Road 2D Road 3D
Opium Profitability (t-1) -0.6669** -0.2858 -0.5448 -0.5484 -0.6578 -0.6589
(0.2977) (0.4923) (0.5009) (0.5020) (0.4383) (0.4385)
Opium Prof. (t-1)*X -0.1872 -0.0012 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0037 0.0038
(0.5553) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0432) (0.0430)
Notes: Linear probability model with province-times-year- and district-fixed effects. The dependent variable is the log of battle-related deaths in (t). Opium
Profitability is defined as the interaction between the normalized international heroin prices (in logarithms) and the suitability to grow opium. Regressions
include interactions of the opium profitability with a variable X as indicated in in the column heading. For definitions of the variables X see Appendix A.
The number of observations is 5174 in every regression, the adjusted R-squared varies between 0.649 and 0.653. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered
at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01
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Table 6
Government control, 2002-2014
Linear Distance Travel Time 3D
1 if < 75 1 if < 100 1 if < 2 1 if < 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Proximity to Kabul
Opium Profitability (t-1) -0.826*** -0.782** -0.893*** -0.826**
(0.308) (0.313) (0.314) (0.325)
Opium Profitability (t-1)*X 1.693** 0.712 1.685** 0.588
(0.800) (0.667) (0.671) (0.508)
Panel B: Proximity to other main cities
Opium Profitability (t-1) -0.685** -0.535 -0.576* -0.557
(0.327) (0.345) (0.319) (0.343)
Opium Profitability (t-1)*X -0.014 -0.463 -0.435 -0.308
(0.527) (0.456) (0.564) (0.507)
Notes: Linear probability models with province-times-year- and district-fixed effects. The dependent
variable is the log of battle-related deaths in (t). Opium Profitability is defined as the interaction
between the normalized international heroin prices (in logarithms) and the suitability to grow opium.
Regressions include interactions of the opium profitability with a variable X as indicated in in the
column heading. For definitions of the variables in X see Appendix A. Other main cities are
Kandahar, Kunduz, Jalalabad, Hirat and Mazari Sharif. The number of observations is 5174 in
every regression, the adjusted R-squared varies between 0.650 and 0.651. Standard errors are in
parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01
D. Exogenous change in policy
Finally, we exploit an important policy change in the foreign coalition’s military strategy.
This helps us to verify the importance of the opium economy in providing jobs. More
importantly, this section sheds some light on the effectiveness of nation-building efforts
and foreign military interventions, linking our study to the literature on nation building,
as for instance Berman et al. (2011) for Iraq and Dell and Querubin (2018) for Vietnam.
These studies often consider a distinction between strategies focusing on the use of
firepower and military force, and strategies based on winning “hearts and minds” by
investing money and providing services and public goods like security. Obviously, each
conflict is different, but nonetheless studying the successes and failures often can provide
important lessons for the future and other contexts. In Afghanistan, the coalition forces
initially provided strong financial support to existing warlords and local strongholds from
roughly 2001 to 2005 to build a strong anti-Taliban coalition. Rough estimates speak of
several “hundred thousands of men” being armed as part of local militias, and more than
60% of provincial governors being “leaders of armed groups and most of the remaining
ones had links to the latter” (Giustozzi, 2009, p. 91). Around 2005, the coalition
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Figure 7
Variation in total opium revenue and total battle-related deaths
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switched their strategy towards a nation-building approach that attempted to pacify
and “clean” Afghan politics. In this process, intense pressure on the Afghan government
forced political leaders and governors to abandon their connection and support to the
militias and many trained and armed men lost their main source of income (Giustozzi,
2009, p. 94 ff.). This change in strategy also coincides with the resurgence of the Taliban.
There is an analogy to the order of events in Iraq, where the de-Baathification process
dissolved the Iraqi army and stopped all senior and mid-level party officials from joining
the new army and security services. Various experts assess that this “drove many
of the suddenly out-of-work Sunni warriors into alliances with a Sunni/anti-American
insurgency” that later joined forces like ISIS, speak of the “pervasive role played by
members of Iraq’s former Baathist army” and estimate that “25 of ISIS’s top 40 leaders
once served in the Iraqi military.”33
We want to test whether the policy change created similar problems in Afghanistan,
especially because the coalition forces at the same time repeatedly declared their aim to
fight opium production (e.g., UNSC Resolution 1563). Dissolving the militias eliminated
many reasonably paid jobs, which should increase the reliance on income from the opium
economy. We exploit the approximate timing of this change in Table 7 and Figure 8,
which show that the connection between drug profitability and conflict becomes much
33 See http://time.com/3900753/isis-iraq-syria-army-united-states-military/, https:
//www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/mideast-crisis-iraq-islamicstate/,
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/how-saddam-husseins-former-military-
officers-and-spies-are-controlling-isis-10156610.html and http://nationalpost.com/news/world/how-
the-catastrophic-american-decision-to-disband-saddams-military-helped-fuel-the-rise-of-isil, accessed
June 14, 2018. A detailed report about “Lessons of De-Baathification in Iraq” is by Sissons and
Al-Saiedi, available at https://www.ictj.org/publication/bitter-legacy-lessons-de-baathification-iraq,
accessed June 14, 2018.
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stronger following 2005. This highlights an important trade-off between “cleaning” the
state and non-state armed groups as well as fighting the production of an illegal resource
at the same time. In contrast to Berman et al. (2011), who rely on survey results about
unemployment for just two years of observations, we thus find further evidence of an
opportunity-cost-based mechanism.
Table 7
Before and after 2005, 2002-2014
(log) BRD 1 if ≥ 5 1 if ≥ 10 1 if ≥ 25 1 if ≥ 100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Opium Profitability (t-1) 0.169 0.039 -0.029 0.012 0.067*
(0.250) (0.082) (0.082) (0.071) (0.037)
Opium Prof. (t-1)*After 2005 -0.489*** -0.123*** -0.094** -0.092** -0.063***
(0.162) (0.045) (0.044) (0.042) (0.024)
Notes: Linear probability models with province-times-year- and district-fixed effects. The dependent
variable is conflict in (t) operationalized as indicated in the column heading. Opium Profitability
is defined as the interaction between the normalized international heroin prices (in logarithms) and
the suitability to grow opium. After 2005 is a binary indicator taking the value of 1 for years after
2005. The number of observations is 5174 in every regression, the adjusted R-squared varies between
0.311 and 0.650. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance
levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01.
Figure 8
Variation in conflict across high and low suitability districts over time
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Notes: To assign a district to low or high suitability, we use a cut-off of 0.4. See Appendix F,
Figure 18 for an alternative cut-off of 0.3. Inferences do not depend on this choice.
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7. Further results and sensitivity analysis
This section explores further results and the sensitivity of our main findings to different
specification choices. All tables and figures related to the results discussed in this section
are reported in Appendices E and F.
Timing of shocks: In a first step, we consider different lag structures in our main
analysis. We do so by first including opium profitability in periods t+ 1, t, and t− 1 at
the same time in Table 13, with t + 1 testing for pre-trends. Second, we compare our
main findings for contemporaneous and lagged effects separately in Table 14. Table 13
shows, as we hypothesize, that opium profitability in t and t − 1 indicates the conflict-
reducing effect, while international opium prices in t+1 interacted with the suitability
to grow opium have no significant effect on conflict. This is reassuring and supports the
causal order and mechanism that we hypothesize. Table 14 shows that including the
contemporaneous and lagged variables individually yields very similar coefficients, with
slightly larger coefficients for our preferred timing (t− 1).
Types of fighting: To better understand the types of violence and the actors involved,
Table 9 presents descriptive statistics. As can be seen, almost all events reported by
UCDP are conflicts between the Taliban and the Afghan government, i.e., two-sided
violence involving the state. Table 15 reports our baseline results for all battle-related
deaths in column 1 and compares these to a more distinct analysis of who is fighting
by looking at the actors and deaths per conflict side. Column 2 considers all casualties
that are caused by Taliban violence against civilians. Results on this type of violence –
that represents only 4% of all casualties – show a smaller and statistically insignificant
negative coefficient. Columns 3 to 5 cover the majority of violent events, those between
Taliban and government. In all specifications, irrespective of whether we look at total
casualties (column 3) or only casualties on one side (column 4 and 5), we find a persistently
negative effect. This exercise provides evidence for a robust conflict-reducing effect of
opium income on two-sided violence throughout our observation period.
Empirical model: First, we show our main results with a less restrictive set of fixed
effects in Table 19 for the different prices in panels A to D. The results using only
district- and year-fixed effects all point in the same direction, with somewhat smaller
coefficients. Again, all four prices consistently indicate a negative effect, both when
looking at conflict intensity and incidence. The larger effects in absolute terms in our
baseline results (Table 2) with province-times-year-fixed effects suggest that these succeed
in eliminating biasing variation.
Next, we consider heterogeneous effects of opium profitability on onset and ending
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of conflict events. Acemoglu and Wolitzky (2014) and Bluhm et al. (2016) point to
the importance of differentiating between the probability of switching from one conflict
state to another as, for instance, from peace to conflict versus from conflict to peace.34
Thus, we also measure the effects for conflict incidence (panel A), onset (panel B), and
ending (panel C) in separate models. Results are presented in Table 20. Panel A verifies
our main finding with a linear probability model by showing similar results when using
conditional logit. In panel B we find that opium profitability consistently reduces the
likelihood of a conflict onset for conflict measured up to a threshold of 25 battle-related
deaths. For conflict ending, we only find a significantly positive effect for smaller conflicts.
These result indicate that a positive income shock and more opium cultivation raise the
likelihood that an ongoing small conflict ends, and reduces the likelihood that conflicts
break out.
Modifications of the treatment variable: We use multiple modifications of our
treatment variable, both by replacing the drug prices and the crop suitabilities with
alternative measures. Tables 21 and 22 are equivalent to our main results presented
in Table 2 apart from the fact that drug prices are not normalized in Table 21 and in
Table 22 the prices are not in logarithms. In Table 23, we use the deviation of the
international prices from their long-term mean.35 This is a first attempt to rule out that
our results are driven by the long-term negative trend in international drug prices as
visible in Figure 3. We find our results to be unaffected by all these choices. With regard
to the suitability, we replace the population-weighted suitability for opium and wheat
with an unweighted version (see Table 24). Weighting is important as population density
differs strongly across Afghanistan, but causes potential bad control problems due to
endogenous migration. While the wheat shock turns insignificant, the results for opium
profitability remain unaffected for all specifications.
Finally, we dichotomize the levels of the interaction. This reduces the complexity of
the DiD-like interpretation. In panel A of Table 25 we dichotomize the suitability based
on the sample median. This allows us to interpret a price increase for two groups of
districts, i.e., suitable (above the median) and less suitable (below the median). In panel
B both variables are dichotomized based on the respective sample median. The coefficient
in panel A indicates that a 10% increase in prices leads to about a 2.3% decrease in battle-
related deaths in districts with a high suitability. Panel B finds that changing from a
low- to a high-price-period reduces deaths by about 50% in districts with high suitability.
34 Berman and Couttenier (2015), for instance, argue that conflict persistence is very low at their level
of analysis (a cell equivalent to 55 times 55 kilometers at the equator) compared to country level data.
Consequently, they do not include the lagged dependent and rather estimate separate models for onset
and ending. We report transition probabilities of the different conflict intensities from peace to war in
Table 11.
35 Specifically, we use the mean over the entire observation period. Due to data restrictions we cannot
calculate the mean over a longer term.
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Across all columns, the results are robust to this adaption.
Outcome and timing (reduced form and IV): In sections 4 and 5 we show that
there is a strong effect on opium revenues. We now replace opium revenues with opium
cultivation in hectares. Table 26 supports the positive effect of a higher opium profitability
on opium cultivation, with positive coefficients that are marginally insignificant in column
1 and significant at the 5% level in column 2 when considering both periods that are most
likely affected by the price change. This is not surprising as opium revenues are affected
through changes in price and produced quantity, and cultivation only by the latter.
We then turn to the IV results. Table 27 shows IV results when replacing the
endogenous variable revenue in t − 1 with cultivation in t − 1. Both panel A reporting
second stage results and panel B reporting the corresponding first stage results support
our findings. To account for the different timing as shown in Figure 2, we show the second
and first stage results when we replace revenue in t−1 with the moving average of revenue
in t− 1 and t in Tables 28 and 29. The two IVs, opium profitability and VHI, are again
strong as indicated by the F-statistic. The overidentification test cannot be rejected,
supporting the validity of the instruments. Lastly, we show different combinations of
the two main instruments in tandem with the time-varying legal opioid prescription
(interacted with opium suitability) as a third instrument (see Tables 30 and 31). Legal
opioids can theoretically increase heroin demand through addictions or substitute the
illegal drug. The negative coefficient in the first stage shows that more legal prescriptions
are linked to a lower opium price. Climate conditions are useful as they are exogenously
assigned and do not follow a clear trend, and legal prescriptions are useful as they are
mostly driven by US-specific factors clearly unrelated to Afghanistan (Dart et al., 2015).
All different combinations lead to highly comparable second stage results and both the F-
statistics and over-identification tests support the power and validity of the instruments.
Having alternative sources of exogenous variation also enables us to compare the LATE
of the different IVs. We find that the local effects do not differ much either in terms of
magnitude or with regard to statistical significance.
Standard errors: In a next step, we use different choices on how to cluster standard
errors. In the baseline models we used the district level, allowing for serial correlation
over time within a district. In Table 32 we use two-way clustering, i.e., district and year
clusters in panel A and province and year clusters in panel B (Cameron et al., 2011).
Clustering at the province level is problematic as the number of clusters might be too
small, which can lead to the over- or under-rejection of the null hypothesis (Cameron and
Miller, 2015). Instead, we use the wild-cluster bootstrap method with the null imposed
with 1000 replications andWebb’s weights (Webb, 2013), which has been shown to provide
valid inference even for few clusters. Figure 15 plots the distribution of the bootstrap
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estimates. The null hypothesis of no effect is rejected both when using the international
heroin price or the complement price index at least at the 5% level.
Covariates and trends: Our specifications so far only include wheat shock and
different fixed effects as covariates. It is natural to first compare these results to not
including this main covariate. In Table 33 we find our results to remain robust to
excluding the wheat shock, with coefficients slightly increasing. To account for the
persistence of conflict, we include the lagged dependent variable in a next step. Opium
profitability remains negative in all columns and statistically significant in columns 1 to 3
(see Table 34). In Table 35 (panel A) we add a baseline set of pre-determined covariates
such as luminosity and population as well as an exogenous measure of droughts, the VHI.
In further specifications (panel B), we also allow for time-varying effects of these time-
invariant control variables.36 One concern with our specification is that the time trends in
prices interact not only with opium suitability, but also with other district characteristics.
One way to model this is by adding interactions between these characteristics and a time
trend. Another more flexible way is to interact the time invariant control variables with
year dummies (panel C). This last specification allows for fully flexible trends interacting
with a wide range of district features. The coefficients of our treatment variable are
remarkably stable, changing from -0.675 in the baseline (column 1, panel B, Table 2) to
-0.694 in the most flexible specification for conflict intensity. They also remain significant
with p-values below at least 0.1 for all conflict proxies (with the sole exception of the
category “war”).
Sensitivity to outliers: In Table 36 we drop potential outliers. In panel A we exclude
all border districts from the specification as they could be either very different to other
districts or shocks in neighboring countries could affect border districts in a different
fashion. For instance, we expect a large share of trafficking to occur close to the border.
This could drive the results if international price increases would not reach the average
farmer but only the traders, which are closer to the final customer along the supply
chain. We find that our results are not driven by this particular group of districts. In
panel B we drop the two southern provinces Kandahar and Helmand and find our results
to remain robust to this choice. These provinces are of specific interest for a number of
reasons. First, the Taliban had their origins in the southern region and are thus likely
to still have a strong support base here. Second, these provinces are known to be the
largest producers of opium. Third, because of their direct connection to Pakistan, which
is not only important in relation to trafficking routes but is also a major base of military
support for the Taliban.
36 The set of time-invariant covariates includes Ruggedness, Ethnic Trafficking Route, Pashtuns, Mixed
Ethnic Groups, Taliban Territory 1996, Mixed Territory 1996, Distance Linear, Distance 2D and 3D,
Travel Time 2D and 3D (all distances to Kabul).
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Apart from these rather obvious heterogeneous groups we systematically investigate
whether results are driven by a particular province or year. Figure 16 reports the
coefficients and the 90% confidence intervals when we drop each year or province at
the time. All coefficients remain stable and within a narrow band.
Randomization: One of the important points raised by Barrett and Christian (2017)
is that non-linear trends in the time series of Bartik/shift-share like instruments can be
problematic. We address this by looking at prices of different drugs and different versions
of these prices (detrended, log vs. non-log). To further rule out that the results are
driven by non-linear trends, we implement further randomization placebo tests. We first
randomize the time-varying variable (international heroin price) across years, and in a
second specification randomize the district-specific suitability across districts. We would
be worried if any of these specifications would create a negative effect similar in magnitude
to our treatment effect. Figure 17 plots the distribution of the coefficients generated by
5’000 randomizations per test along with the actual coefficient. We can also use this to
conduct a randomization inference (RI) exercise, in which we compare how many of the
random draws generate coefficients that are more negative than ours in order to compute
an RI p-value. Reassuringly, we find that if the treatment was randomized according to
the two different strategies, the simulated coefficients are always centered around zero.
The p-values computed using two-sided symmetric randomization inference are 0.021.
Taken together, our results (i) do not depend on the choice of a linear or non-linear
model or (ii) on the level at which we cluster standard errors, (iii) are robust to several
modifications of the treatment and outcome variable, (iv) are barely affected and actually
more negative when accounting for comprehensive sets of covariates, (v) are not driven
by obvious outliers or particular provinces, and (vi) survive randomization placebo tests.
8. Conclusion
This paper provides new evidence on the conflict-resource-curse and the effects of
resource-related income shocks (e.g., Van der Ploeg and Rohner, 2012; Berman and
Couttenier, 2015; Morelli and Rohner, 2015; Berman et al., 2017) by shedding light on
the micro-foundations of the underlying mechanisms. For this purpose, we focus on
Afghanistan, which is a practical case from a researcher’s perspective for at least three
main reasons. First, despite the high intensity of conflict, we were able to collect a
rich dataset including household level information. Second, different conflict actors can
be identified and distinguished. Third, the country is characterized by a high variation
across space with regard to resources, the distribution of ethnic groups and government
influence. Although any conflict is distinct, we believe this case provides important
lessons for other settings. Many conflict-ridden countries struggle with weak government
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enforcement, are ethnically diverse with difficulties in forming stable coalitions, feature a
weak labor market with heavy reliance on one specific product, and often face obstacles
in nation-building associated with foreign interventions.
Overall our reduced-form results show that, on average, a 10% increase in opium
prices decrease the number of battle-related deaths by about 7% in districts with the
highest possible suitability to grow opium. These results are robust to using different
international and local prices and to exploiting the relationship between opium and
complement drugs. It seems that our baseline specification using heroin prices is – if
one is worried about potential biases – most likely an upper bound of the true negative
effect. The reduced-form results using international prices are quantified using IV results
that also exploit exogenous weather changes (like e.g., Brückner and Ciccone, 2010) and
legal opioid prescriptions in the United States. All IVs yield local average treatment
effects that are comparable in size. Finally, several robustness tests address the potential
risk that the overall downward trend in drug prices correlates with suitability-specific
trends in other variables (Barrett and Christian, 2017).
The results add to the literature in several important ways. First, they augment the
scarce literature on the effect of illegal resource-shocks (Angrist and Kugler, 2008; Mejia
and Restrepo, 2015), and document that these shocks need not necessarily induce conflict.
Second, by comparing the effects of opium- to wheat-related shocks we support Dube and
Vargas’ (2013) seminal study for Colombia by showing that labor intensity matters in
determining the effect of resource-related income changes. Third, we verify the relevance
of opportunity costs as a mechanism both by relying on district- and household level
data. We thus emphasize the degree to which a high share of Afghans indeed rely on
“illegal” income sources in satisfying basic needs.
Fourth, we highlight the importance of market structures, group competition and
monopolies of violence for analyses of resource-related shocks. This is particularly relevant
for illicit products, where the de jure illegality pushes up margins and supports the
creation of rival cartels, which are willing to accept the related risks and exploit the
potential for profits. The conflict in Afghanistan after 2001 is largely between two
factions, the government plus associated groups on one side and the Taliban on the
other side (see Trebbi and Weese, 2016). Consequently, we assess whether a district is
likely to be under Taliban or government control. We find that in districts where the
Taliban are more likely to have a monopoly of violence, the conflict-reducing effect is
stronger. This supports qualitative evidence that the rebel group has given up its prior
anti-drug stance and is actively involved in the drug trade, acting as a kind of stationary
bandit (De La Sierra, 2015).
Fifth, we highlight the role of government enforcement. The reduction in conflict
caused by a higher opium profitability is partly explained by the apparently loose
enforcement of the “illegality” of opium production. Enforcement could be driven by
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both the willingness and the ability of the government. Our results suggest that the only
areas where government control is sufficiently strong to engage in enforcement are within a
limited area around the capital Kabul (comparable to Michalopoulos and Papaioannou,
2014, for Africa). If the government enforces the rules, farmers have an incentive to
support the Taliban in exchange for protection of their opium-related activities. This in
turn leads to a higher potential for conflict with pro-government groups. In line with our
theoretical considerations, we find no conflict-reducing effect in those districts that are
close to Kabul.
While we do not claim that our findings can explain the conflict in Afghanistan in
all its complexity, they augment existing insights (e.g., Bove and Elia, 2013; Lyall et al.,
2013; Lind et al., 2014; Condra et al., 2018). Although we cannot make strong claims
beyond our observation period, the findings are in line with the spread of conflict in
Afghanistan in the last years that featured falling prices and lower opium profitability.
We use results at the province- and country-level to verify that higher opium revenues
do, on average, not seem to spill-over and create conflict in other parts of Afghanistan.
In a context with weak labor markets and few outside opportunities, depriving farmers
of their main source of income by enforcing rules through eradication measures has to be
weighted against the impact on households and the risk of fueling conflict. At the same
time, it is, of course, also too simplistic and naive to conclude that opium production is
“good” and should not be considered a potential problem.
Instead, we aim to highlight the importance of understanding the underlying trade-offs
in order to derive sound policy measures that consider the “unseen” or unexpected indirect
consequences of those choices. Our results suggests that the dissolving of militia groups,
which provided employment and income sources for many Afghans, intensified the reliance
on opium as an income source. There are, of course, good reasons for demilitarizing
societies as well as for tackling illicit economies in attempts of nation-building (relating
to Berman et al., 2011; Dell and Querubin, 2018). Nonetheless, if there are no attractive
and feasible alternatives, both aims are hard to achieve individually and even more so
simultaneously.
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APPENDIX
A. Definition of the variables
Any Lab: The information on the existence of laboratories used for processing
opium is based on UNODC reports regarding drug markets, labs, and trafficking routes
(e.g., UNODC, 2006/07, 2014, 2016). As described in Appendix H, we georeference the
maps in the reports to assign coordinates to the labs, and later compute district averages.
For this variable, we count all type of heroin laboratories. It takes on the value 1 if there
is at least one lab in a district i, and 0 otherwise.
Any Military Base:We use information from Wikipedia’s GeoHack program for the
more well-known bases and on news articles, and Wikimapia and Google Maps satellite
data for the less well-documented ones. The approach is described in detail in Section H.
Note that we are most likely not capturing all existing locations, as we did not receive
the exact information about opening and closing for all military bases. Opening and
closing dates were coded with the available information, if there was no information
about shutting down a base we assume it is still active. The variable takes on the value
one if there is at least one open military base in a district i in year t, and 0 otherwise.
Battle-Related Deaths (BRD): The best (most likely) estimate of total fatalities
resulting from an event, with an event being defined as “[an] incident where armed force
was by an organized actor against another organized actor, or against civilians, resulting
in at least 1 direct death at a specific location and a specific date.” A direct death is
defined as “a death relating to either combat between warring parties or violence against
civilians.” Note that UCDP/GED only includes BRD of events that belong to a dyad
(“two conflicting primary parties or party killing unarmed civilians”) that reached in total
at least 25 BRD within one year. If the dyad generated events with less then 25 BRD in
the previous or subsequent years, they are still counted if the dyad had reached the 25
BRD threshold in another year. We construct a continuous measure (log of BRD) and
binary outcomes from all BRD of any party or any type of violence (state-based, non-state
or one-sided violence). To capture the lowest level of conflict in a binary measure, we
classify a district-year observation with at least five BRD small conflict. We then increase
the threshold to 10 for the next level of conflict intensity (low conflict). In analogy to the
threshold used in macro level analyses, we call a district-year observation conflict if there
are more than 25 BRD. At the top, we take a threshold of 100 BRD for the most severe
level of violence what we call war. Since UCDP/GED provides information on the parties
and the type of violence we also construct specific outcome measures according to those
categories. Besides different measures of incidence, we also construct measures on onset
and ending. We define conflict onset as the incidence of a conflict in a district, where there
was no conflict in the previous year (Conflicti,t = 1|Conflicti,t−1 = 0). Years of ongoing
1
conflict are set to missing. In analogy, a conflict ending is defined when conflict persisted
in the previous year but not anymore in the current year (Conflicti,t = 0|Conflicti,t−1 =
1). We also set the ending variable missing for observations which have been at peace in
the previous year and remained in peace in the current year, following the standards in
the literature. From UCDP/GED (Sundberg and Melander, 2013; Croicu and Sundberg,
2015).
Calorie Intake and Food Insecurity: The woman’s questionnaire provides
amounts, frequencies and sources of a large set of food items, which we use to construct
measures on calorie intake and food insecurity. We multiply amounts consumed with
kcal values for that food item to get total household calorie intake. The kcal values are
provided by the CSO and The World Bank (2011). To get a binary indicator on food
insecurity we use the reference value of 2100 calories per day as recommended by the
FAO. Total household daily calorie intake is divided by the number of members that
were resident and ate at least dinner regularly in the household during the last seven
days to get per capita measures. Source: NRVA (CSO, 2005,2007/08,2011/12).
Consumer Price Index (CPI): From OECD (2016) for the Euro area (19 countries)
and from World Bank (2016) for remaining countries (2010 = 100).
Dietary Diversity: According to Wiesmann et al. (2009, p. 5) ”Dietary diversity
is defined as the number of different foods or food groups eaten over a reference time
period, which in my case is one week, not regarding the frequency of consumption.” We
classify the different food items from the survey into eight food groups as explained in
Wiesmann et al. (2009). These groups are staples, pulses, vegetables, fruit, meat/fish,
milk/dairy, sugar, and oil/fat. The variable varies between zero and eight, with eight
indicating a high food diversity. Source: NRVA (CSO, 2005,2007/08,2011/12).
Distance/Proximity to Kabul (capital) and Kandahar, Kunduz, Jalalabad,
Hirat, and Mazari Sharif (next five largest cities): We use the shapefiles provided
by the Afghan statistical authority on the 398 Afghan districts. Note that the shapefiles
available at www.gadm.org do not reflect the current status of administrative division
in Afghanistan, and instead we use the one from Empirical Studies of Conflict (ESOC)
Princeton (https://esoc.princeton.edu/files/administrative-boundaries-398-districts). To
compute the distances, we first create the centroid of each district polygon. To compute
road distances we combined road shapefiles from the official Afgan authorities with street
maps from open street map, which were improved by voluntary contributors to close
gaps in the official maps. 3D-distances were computed using elevation data from the
US Geological Survey (https://lta.cr.usgs.gov/GMTED2010, accessed July 9, 2018). We
add the elevation information to the shapefile containing the roads, and then compute
and save three-dimensional distances. We then use the network analyst in ArcGIS to
set up a network between all district centroids, clipping centroids that do not overlap
with a street in that district that is closest with regard to the as-the-bird-flies distance.
2
Then, we compute the most efficient routes using road distances in two- and three-
dimensions. The distances are saved in a matrix and exported in a table that is further
processed in Stata. For the variable “distance to other main cities” we use the minimum
distance to any of the five cities. For travel time we use the distinction of roads in three
classes (motorways, rural, urban), and assign commonly used values for average traveling
speed for that road type based on three sources. The first source is UNESCAP (http:
//www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/2.4.Afghanistan.pdf, page 14) which assumes that
the speed on motorways is 90 km/h and on urban roads 50km/h. The second source is
IRU (https://www.iru.org/apps/infocentre-item-action?id=560&lang=en) which states
no limits except for urban areas with 50km/h. The 3rd source is WHO (http://apps.
who.int/gho/data/view.main.51421) reporting 90km/h for rural. We choose the following
average traveling speeds, assuming that no strictly enforced limits and little traffic on
motorways (120km/h), and accounting for some (90km/h-10km/h) and moderate traffic
in cities (50-20km/h). Thus our main choice is the following. Motorways: 120km/h,
rural: 80km/h, urban: 30km/h. These choices are not perfect, but we verify that our
results hold with other variations as well.
For the proximity to Kabul and other main cities we also define binary indicators for
the distance being smaller than 75km (1 if < 75) or smaller than 100 km (1 if < 100). In
analogy to these categories we construct indicators for the travel time to Kabul or one of
the other main cities falling below 2 or 3h.
Drug Prices (International): The data are average prices per gram in constant
(2010) EU across all available countries in Europe. We use data on different drugs:
amphetamines, cocaine, ecstasy, heroin (brown). To construct the average price of
alternative drugs we use a mean of the three upper drugs amphetamines, cocaine, and
ecstasy. For the analysis we convert all drug prices into constant 2010 EU per gram.
We then normalize the prices by using a linear min-max function such that all prices
vary between 0 and 1. From European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction
(EMCDDA).
Economically Improved: This variable refers to the question “How do you compare
the overall economic situation of the household with 1 year ago?” 1 indicates much worse,
2 slightly worse, 3 same, 4 slightly better, and 5 much better. This is a self-reported
measure of the household. Source: NRVA (CSO, 2005,2007/08,2011/12).
Ethnic Groups: We have used the GIS-coordinates of all ethnic groups in the
“georeferencing of ethnic groups” (GREG) dataset Weidmann et al. (2010). It relies
on maps from the classical “Soviet Atlas Narodov Mira” from 1964, and is very
extensively used for the construction of ethnolinguistic fractionalization indices. GREG
is a georeferenced dataset containing the coordinates of the group boundaries of 1120
ethnic groups. One advantage and disadvantage of the data is that it is capturing group
locations in the 1960s. This is an advantage as it ensures that the boundaries are not
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endogenous to changes during our period of observation. It is partly a disadvantage if
groups and countries changed over time. In Afghanistan, the country boundary did not
change. Ethnic group populations certainly change to some degree over time, so that
all variables more precisely capture the historic homelands of ethnic groups rather than
the current settlement areas. Our variable Pashtuns is coded in the following way. The
GREG polygons can contain more than one ethnic group. Our binary indicator takes on
the value one if Pashtuns are present to any degree in a district i, regardless of whether
they were the majority group. The idea behind this is that the Taliban are initially
a Pashtun group (although not exclusively anymore), so that Pashtun presence could
make it easier to establish a presence of the Taliban in a district. We also construct
two measures on whether a district is ethnically mixed, first by using the the number of
ethnic groups and second by generating a binary indicator, which takes a value of 1 if
the number of ethnic groups is larger 1.
Ethnic Trafficking Route: This variable combines information about unofficial
border crossings from UNODC with information about the homelands of ethnic groups
from the (GREG) dataset (Weidmann et al., 2010). It takes on the value of 1 if there is a
potential trafficking route leading from a district to at least one unofficial border crossing
point without crossing the ethnic homeland of another group. The underlying intuition is
that trafficking is cheaper and significantly easier to conduct, and the accruing additional
profits higher, if there is no need to cross the area of other ethnic groups to transport
over the border.
Food Expenditures (Paasche/Laspeyres): Following the literature, we include
food items from all possible sources, i.e., purchased food or food in form of gifts etc. We
use the section on food consumption from the NRVA women’s questionnaire as this section
offers precise amounts per food item. The food items are merged to local prices, which
are provided in a separate section of the NRVA, the district questionnaire. Prices vary
at the district level. We show three food expenditure measures, which are all measured
in constant 2011 prices, i.e., prices of the 2011/12 survey wave. Only food items that
appear in all three waves are included to build the measure.
The first measure “Food Exp. 2011 Prices” does not account for spatial price
differences. “Food Exp. 2011 Prices, Paasche” and “Food Exp. 2011 Prices, Laspeyres”
adjust for spatial price differences, since households in different districts face different
prices. Missing values of district prices are replaced by the province median, which in
case of missing values has been replaced by the national median price. For close to all
reported food items prices have been given in the district questionnaire. Information
on food and drinks consumed outside the house (from the male survey section) are also
included in the total food expenditure measures (adjusted for inflation and regional price
differences depending on the measure). Expenditures are meaured in per capita terms by
dividing the total household food expenditure with the number of households (resident
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and ate at least dinner regularly in the household during the last seven days). Source:
NRVA (CSO, 2005,2007/08,2011/12).
Inflation, GDP Deflator: GDP deflator for the United States with 2010 as the
base year. From World Bank (2016).
Insecurity/Violence Shock: The share of sampled households per district that
have experienced a shock due to insecurity/violence according to the NRVA survey (CSO,
2005,2007/08,2011/12).
Legal Opioids: The data are collected using a variety of sources. The reason is
that most single publications did not cover our whole sample period, and that we want to
cross-verify the numbers. A main source is the US CDC Public Health surveillance report
2017, available at https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/47832. Other important sources were
Manchikanti et al. (2012); Kenan and Mack (2012); Dart et al. (2015).
Local Opium Price: Local price data on opium is derived from the annual
Afghanistan Opium Price Monitoring reports UNODC. These reports include (monthly)
province level dry opium prices by farmers and by traders as well as country-wide yearly
data on fresh opium farm-gate prices, that are weighted by regional production. The
province level opium prices of farmers and traders are highly correlated, with a correlation
coefficient close to 1 (0.998). The correlation between the country level farm-gate price
and the province level farm-gate price is 0.66, significant at the 1% level. While the
province level prices are only available from 2006 to 2013 and for a subset of provinces,
they are still very helpful in identifying whether international prices are correlated with
local prices. We use the country-wide yearly data on fresh opium farm-gate prices in
Afghanistan interacted with the suitability as one proxy for opium profitability in our
regressions in Table 2, Panel A.
Luminosity: Proxy for GDP and development. The yearly satellite data are cloud-
free composites made using all the available smooth resolution data for calendar years.
The products are 30 arc second grids, spanning -180 to 180 degrees longitude and -65 to
75 degrees latitude. A number of constraints are used to select the highest quality data
for entry into the composites: Data are from the center half of the 3000 km wide OLS
swaths. Lights in the center half have better geolocation, are smaller, and have more
consistent radiometry. Sunlit data and glare are excluded based on the solar elevation
angle, Moonlit data based on a calculation of lunar illuminance. Observations with
clouds are excluded based on clouds identified with the OLS thermal band data and
NCEP surface temperature grids. Lighting features from the aurora have been excluded
in the northern hemisphere on an orbit-by-orbit manner using visual inspection. From
Version 4 DMSP-OLS nighttime lights time series, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration-National Geophysical Data Center (NOAA/NGDC, https://www.ngdc.
noaa.gov, 2013). We take the logarithm.
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Markets (Major/Sub) and Sum of all Markets: The information on opium
markets is based on UNODC reports regarding drug markets, labs, and trafficking routes
(e.g., UNODC 2006/07, 2014, 2016). The first variable takes on the value one if there
is at least one major or sub-market in district i, and 0 otherwise. The second variables
counts the sum of all opium markets in a district (both sub and major).
Market Access: Market access for a district i is computed asMAi =
∑N
j=1 dist
−θ
i,jWj.
Wj is the importance of district j proxied using either the number of opium markets
or mean luminosity (or population). disti,j are the distances between the district and
the other districts and θ is the factor discounting other districts that are further way.
We use a factor of 1, as in Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016). To take account of the
topography and mountainous terrain in Afghanistan, we compute distances using the
two-dimensional road network (Market Access 2D) as well as a three-dimensional road
network when adjusting for elevation (Market Access 3D).
Mixed/Taliban Territory 1996: The book by Dorronsoro (2005) provides a map
indicating the territory of the Taliban in 1996 and of other major groups of the Northern
Alliance (Dschunbisch-o Islami, Dschamiat-i Islami, Hizb-i Wahdat). We georeferenced
the map and aligned it with the district boundaries. In many cases, the division was
quite clearly aligned or overlapping with a district boundary, in the other cases we chose
the closest district boundary. We classify a district as a Mixed Territory if it is part of
the Taliban 1996 territory and part of the territory of any of the three groups belonging
to the Nothern Alliance. The binary indicator on Taliban Territory that we create take
on the value one if a district belongs to the territory that was occupied or under the
control of the Taliban in 1996. A second indicator (Taliban Territory 1996 - No North)
is defined whether the district exclusively occupied by the Taliban and is characterized
by no presence of the Northern Alliance. More details can be found in Dorronsoro (2005)
and Giustozzi (2009).
Opium Cultivation and Revenues: Opium cultivation in hectares. Data at the
district level is an estimate from the data at the province level. We use logged values
for opium cultivation and for revenues. From opium cultivation and the respective yields
we were able to calculate actual opium production at the district-year level. We also
constructed opium revenues by multiplying opium production in kg with the fresh opium
farm-gate prices at harvest time in constant 2010 EU/kg. From the Annual Opium Poppy
Survey (UNDCP, 2000) and Afghanistan Opium Survey (UNODC, 2001-2014).
Opium Suitability: Proxy for potential of opium production based on exogenous
underlying information about land cover, water availability, climatic suitability, and soil
suitability. It was developed in the context of a study in collaboration with UNODC,
and is described in detail in a publication in a geographical science journal (Kienberger
et al., 2017). The environmental as well as climatic suitability to cultivate opium poppy
(Papaver somniferum) is characterized by different factors such as the prevailing physio-
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geographical and climatic characteristics using climatic suitability based on the EcoCrop
model from Hijmans et al. (2001). The factor determined to be most important by
experts is land cover (S1, 0.41 – the sum of the weights equals 1.0), followed by water
availability (S2, 0.28) and climatic conditions (S3, 0.21) respectively. This is in line with
additional studies previously carried out by UNODC and described in the World Drug
Report (2011) for Myanmar. From Kienberger et al. (2017). The data and the index
itself was modeled on a 1km2 resolution and then aggregated to the district units by
an area weighted mean approach. The original indicator values were normalized using
a linear min–max function between a possible value range of 0 and 100 to allow for
comparison and aggregation. Only the land cover indicator was normalized integrating
expert judgments through an Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) approach. The four
indicators were then subsequently aggregated applying weighted means (weights were
verified through expert consultations building on the AHP method). None of the input
factors constituting the index is itself to a major degree affected by conflict, which is
the outcome variable. Consequently, the index values by district can be considered as
exogenously given.
We weight the opium and wheat suitabilities with the (lagged) population distribution
within the districts. This is helpful as, for instance, the south features large desert
areas and at the same time concentrated areas with dense population, and accounting
for the suitability in uninhabited desert areas might be misleading (our results are not
significantly affected by this choice).
Population: A minimally-modeled gridded population data collection that
incorporates census population data from the 2010 round of censuses. Population
estimates are derived by extrapolating the raw census estimates to a series of target years
and are provided for the years 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, and 2020. We use the ipolated
data from 2000 till 2015. We take the logarithm. From the Center for International
Earth Science Information Network - CIESIN - Columbia University. 2016. Gridded
Population of the World, Version 4 (GPWv4): Administrative Unit Center Points with
Population Estimates. Palisades, NY: NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications
Center (SEDAC). Source: http://dx.doi.org/10.7927/H4F47M2C, accessed October 5,
2017.
Ruggedness: The data on terrain ruggedness is the same that was used in Nunn
and Puga (2012), although we use it on a more disaggregated level. We calculate the
average ruggedness index for every district. While ruggedness refers to the variance in
elevation, we also use raw elevation data from the NASA Shuttle Radat Topography
Mission (SRTM) data set. The data set and a detailed documentation are available at
http://diegopuga.org/data/rugged/.
Southern Provinces: Dummy variable which turns one for districts located in one
of the two provinces Kandahar and Hilmand, and 0 otherwise.
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Sum of Assets (weighted): The number of assets the households possess over
a set of assets that is constant over the 3 survey waves. This set consists of
Radio/Tape, Refrigerator, TV, VCR/DVD, Sewing Machine, Thuraya (any phone),
Bicycle, Motorcycle, Tractor/Thresher, Car. Sum of Assets weighted is the sum of asset
weighted by the proportion of households not possessing the specific item. Source: NRVA
(CSO, 2005, 2007/08, 2011/12).
Travel Time to Kabul and other main cities: Hours required to travel from
district centroid to Kabul. For details about distance computation see Distances.
Vegetation Health Index (VHI): We use the Vegetation Health Index (VHI)
of FAO (Van Hoolst et al., 2016). VHI is a composite index joining the Vegetation
Condition Index (VCI) and the Temperature Condition Index (TCI, Kogan 1995). Low
values of VHI represent drought conditions. This is a combination of low values of
the observed VCI (relatively low vegetation) and higher values of the TCI (relatively
warm weather). For details see Van Hoolst et al. (2016). The VHI is calculated
from data of Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer (AVHRR) sensors on board
of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and Meteorological
Operational Satellite (METOP) satellites. It is superior to simply using precipitation
data, which do not directly measure drought conditions, require assumptions about the
linearity of the effect and, in particular in Afghanistan, have severe limitations in terms of
quality and resolution. The index is based on earth observation data and is available on
a monthly basis with a resolution of 1km2. As cultivation and harvest times differ within
Afghanistan, we use the yearly average. The remote sensing based index is operationally
used to monitor drought conditions in the Global Early Warning System (GEWS), low
VHI values indicate drought conditions.
Wheat Price (International): Source is the International Monetary Fund Primary
Commodity Prices database (IMF, 2017). IMF reports benchmark prices which are
representative of the global market. They are determined by the largest exporter of
a given commodity. The prices are period averages and are in nominal US dollars (2005
as baseline).
Wheat Suitability: The FAO-GAEZ (2012) model provides for each crop/Land
Utilization Type (LUT) a comprehensive soil suitability evaluation for all the soil
units contained in the Harmonized World Soil Database (HWSD). This is done by
the use of individual soil quality ratings (SQ). Seven different SQs are calculated
and are combined in a soil unit suitability rating (SR, %). The SR represents
the percentage of potential yield expected for a given crop/LUT with respect to
the soil characteristics present in a soil map unit of the HWSD and is depending
on input/management level. Source: Global Agro-ecological Zones (GAEZ v3.0) by
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO-GAEZ 2012).
Details are provided on the website http://www.fao.org/nr/gaez/about-data-portal/
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agricultural-suitability-and-potential-yields/en/, accessed October 12, 2016. Move to
the section “Agro-ecological suitability and productivity” to find the suitability we use
and access the data portal for downloads.
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B. Descriptive statistics
Table 8
Descriptives: 2005-2012
Obs. Mean Stand. Dev. Min Max
BRD
(log) All 5174 1.11 1.54 0.00 8.20
Small Conflict 5174 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00
Low Conflict 5174 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00
Conflict 5174 0.14 0.34 0.00 1.00
War 5174 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00
(log) Taliban-Civilians 5174 0.08 0.37 0.00 4.14
(log) Taliban-Government 5174 1.05 1.52 0.00 8.20
(log) Government BRD by Taliban 5174 0.53 0.94 0.00 8.03
(log) Taliban BRD by Government 5174 0.77 1.33 0.00 6.39
(log) Opium Profitability
Int. Heroin 5174 -1.52 0.66 -4.61 -0.00
Local Opium 5174 -1.04 0.70 -4.61 0.01
Int. Complement 5174 -1.30 0.56 -3.17 -0.00
Int. Cocaine 5174 -1.15 0.67 -4.61 -0.00
Distance to Kabul
Linear 5148 277.05 181.54 0.00 817.64
Road 2D 5174 345.03 212.05 0.00 959.78
Road 3D 5174 347.47 213.08 0.00 964.48
Travel Time 2D 5174 7.53 5.91 0.00 28.40
Travel Time 3D 5174 7.57 5.94 0.00 28.45
Market Access
Opium Market 2D 5174 4.47 1.10 2.24 11.23
Opium Market 3D 5174 2.63 0.69 1.33 6.93
Luminosity 2D 5174 6.51 4.86 1.85 41.26
Luminosity 3D 5174 6.47 4.84 1.85 41.24
Continued on next page
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Table 8 continued
All other variables
(log) Wheat Shock 5174 -0.48 0.46 -2.11 0.01
Opium Suitability 5174 0.53 0.18 0.00 1.00
Wheat Suitability 5174 0.55 0.23 0.00 1.00
(log) Cultivation 5174 1.38 2.15 0.00 6.91
(log) Opium Revenue 5149 4.26 5.83 0.00 16.98
Luminosity 4776 0.49 3.03 0.00 58.01
Vegetation Health Index (VHI) 5173 124.08 23.20 51.28 191.99
(log) Population 5174 3.96 1.24 0.44 9.58
Ruggedness in 1000 5148 299.18 216.54 4.48 877.01
Any Military Base 5174 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00
Major/Sub Market 5174 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00
Sum of all Markets 5174 0.40 0.85 0.00 8.00
Any Lab 5174 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00
Ethnic Trafficking Route 5174 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00
Mixed Territory 1996 5174 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00
Taliban Territory 1996 5174 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00
Pashtuns 5174 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00
Ethnicity - 1 if Mixed 5174 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00
Number Ethnic Group 5174 1.93 0.97 1.00 5.00
Notes: The sample is based on the specification in Table 2, column 1.
Table 9
Type of violence and fighting parties
Frequency Percent
(1) (2)
Conflict Dyads
Government of Afghanistan - Taliban 14,853 93.93
Taliban - Civilians 614 3.88
Government of United States of America - al-Qaida 125 0.97
Type of violence
State-based violence 15,084 95.39
Non-state violence 631 3.99
One-sided violence 98 0.62
Notes: Summary on types of violence provided by UCDP GED between 2002-2014.
11
Table 10
Balancing tests: High and low opium suitable districts
Mean Values per Group P-Value
High Suitability Low Suitability
Ruggedness in 1000 286.052 342.550 0.000
Distance to Kabul - Linear 248.425 371.647 0.000
Distance to Kabul - Road 2D 311.787 454.068 0.000
Distance to Kabul - Road 3D 314.037 457.126 0.000
Travel Time to Kabul - Road 2D 6.560 10.693 0.000
Travel Time to Kabul - Road 3D 6.597 10.755 0.000
Pashtuns 0.780 0.602 0.000
Mixed Ethnic Groups 0.538 0.742 0.000
Number Ethnic Groups 1.830 2.247 0.000
Mixed Territory 1996 0.030 0.075 0.000
Taliban Territory 1996 0.593 0.527 0.000
Ethnic Trafficking Route 0.557 0.409 0.000
BRD 2000 14.308 11.075 0.172
Luminosity 2000 0.160 0.213 0.322
(log) Population 2000 3.974 2.654 0.000
Wheat Suitability 0.609 0.371 0.000
Notes: Sample based on Table 2, column 1. To assign a districts to low or high suitability, we use
a cut-off of 0.4. In Table 35 we control for an interaction of all the variables (above the separating
line) with a time trend or with time-fixed effects.
Table 11
Unconditional transition matrix
1 if 0 1 if >0 1 if >10 1 if >25 1 if >100
1 if 0 87.49 7.55 2.46 1.85 0.64
1 if >0 36.86 35.41 15.81 9.76 2.17
1 if >10 23.46 30.19 19.81 23.27 3.27
1 if >25 19.90 13.21 16.64 36.54 13.70
1 if >100 19.25 7.55 4.15 28.68 40.38
Notes: Sample based on Table 2, column 1.
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C. Geographical overview
Afghanistan and its neighboring states
Notes: Opium is reported to be mostly trafficked through Iran, Pakistan as well as through
Turkmenistan according to UNODC.
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Elevation and mountainous terrain in Afghanistan
Notes: The central and north-eastern part of Afghanistan feature the most mountainous terrain.
Mountains are correlated with opium suitability, for instance very high altitude areas with a lot
of snow are obviously unsuitable, but generally opium can be produced in many places as our
map for the suitability indicator shows. We will run regressions with and without the border
districts, as well as regressions controlling for elevation or ruggedness (in a flexible way interacted
with year dummies) to account for potentially time-varying effects of these factors. Source for
elevation data: US Geological Survey (USGS) Global Multi-resolution Terrain Elevation Data 2010
(GMTED2010), available at https://lta.cr.usgs.gov/GMTED2010, accessed June 4, 2018. Source
for ADM1 administrative data is www.gadm.org, accessed June 4, 2018.
Figure 11
ADM1 level (provinces) of Afghanistan
Notes: The figure plots the 34 provinces (ADM1 level). Source: Central Statistical Office
Afghanistan, available at http://afghanag.ucdavis.edu/country-info/about-afghan.html, accessed
July 9, 2018.
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D. Identification using complement prices
Assume that we estimate a regression
conflictd,t = b× drug pricet−1 × suit+ τt + δd + εd,t, (4)
but the true regression is
conflictd,t = β × drug pricet−1 × suit+ τt + δd + γ × suit ∗OVt−1 + ϑd,t. (5)
The drug prices (of opium and complements) depend on the following factors: i) changes
in demand, to which we refer to as common demand shifters (DS ′), ii) changes in opium
supply (qO), and iii) changes in the supply of the complement (qC).
Accordingly, we have
pOt−1 = f(
(+)
DS
′
t−1,
(−)
qOt−1,
(+)
qCt−1) (6)
and
pCt−1 = f(
(+)
DS
′
t−1,
(+)
qOt−1,
(−)
qCt−1). (7)
The omitted variable OVt varies at the time level, in our case by year. To be relevant
for our estimation, we assume that OV has a nonzero effect on the outcome, i.e., γ 6= 0,
and the effect varies conditional on the suitability (suit). suit ∼ [0, 1], with higher values
indicating a higher suitability for production. At the same time, OV must also affect
opium supply and in turn opium prices, again differentially conditional on suit. More
formally, in case E[qOt−1, suitd × OVt−1] 6= 0, a potentially problematic bias could arise.
Given the negative point estimates in our regression analysis when we use the opium
price, we would be worried about a downward bias in the coefficient b, which could lead
to the false rejection of the null hypothesis. However, what we show in the following
is relevant for both an upward and a downward bias. Note that ∂q
O
t−1
∂(suitd×OVt−1) < 0, so
that ∂p
O
t−1
∂(suitd×OVt−1) > 0. We exploit the fact that the bias resulting from the omitted
variable (conditional on suitability) through its effect on opium supply works in different
directions for the complement than it does for opium: ∂p
C
t−1
∂OVt−1
= (−1) ∂pOt−1
∂OVt−1
.
How does this help us in the causal interpretation of our estimations? We describe the
opium price and the price of complements, how the two relate to each other, and under
which assumptions we can use the relationship between the two to better understand
causality. We then verify and illustrate this relationship and its implications with a
Monte Carlo simulation. We are particularly interested in the relationship between the
two prices, and a potential suitability-specific effect of an omitted variable on opium
supply.
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Opium price:
Consider the price of opium as a linear function:
pOt−1 = DSt − qOt−1 +$ × qCt−1 + Ot−1,
where the factors directly influencing supply can be distinguished as
qOt−1 = Xt−1 + η ×
D∑
d=1
suitd ×OVt−1 + qOt−1.
$ indicates to which degree opium and the complement are related ($ ∼ U [0, 1]), i.e.,
how strong the cross-price elasticity is. The second equation means that the opium
supply in year t is influenced by factors Xt−1 like temperature and precipitation that are
unrelated to the suitability-specific effect of the omitted variable, and by the suitability-
specific shock caused by the omitted variable.37 η indicates the degree to which the
omitted variable influences opium supply and the opium price (η ∼ |N (0, σ2)|). We sum
up over all districts d, and assume that the omitted variable has a stronger effect on high
suitability districts. Furthermore, we make one important assumption: We assume that
supply shocks of the complement qCt−1 can be related to overall opium supply, but are
exogenous to district level differences in supply in Afghanistan, ρ(qCt−1, suitd×OVt−1) = 0.
We further validate this assumption by considering both an index of complements, as
well as cocaine for which supply and trafficking routes (and related shocks) clearly differ
from opium (heroin). Accordingly, both the term Xt−1 and qCt−1 are captured by year-
fixed effects τt in Equation 4, and can be omitted without affecting the estimation of b.
Ot−1 ∼ N (0, σ2) is an iid error term. Assuming for simplicity that demand shifters and
potentially endogenous opium supply influence the price in an additive manner yields
pOt−1 = DSt − η ×
D∑
d=1
suitd ×OVt−1 + Ot−1. (8)
with η ∼ |N (0, σ2)| being the degree to which the omitted variable influences pOt−1 and
Ot−1 being an iid error term.
Complement price:
The price of the complement is
pCt−1 = DSt − qCt−1 +$ × qOt−1 + Ct−1,
and inserting qCt−1 leads to
pCt−1 = DSt +$ × (Xt−1 + η ×
D∑
d=1
suitd ×OVt−1 + Ot−1)− qCt−1 + Ct−1.
For a negative cross-price elasticity, $ is positive: as qO increases, the price of
opium decreases, polydrug consumers have more money available, the demand for the
37We simplify and just use X instead of summing up over all potential factors weighted by their
importance.
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complement increases, which leads to a price increase in the complement. To be
problematic, a supply-side shock must be caused by an omitted variable and must be
suitability-specific. The main feature that we exploit is that the effect of those shocks,
which might also be correlated with conflict, affect the opium and the complement price
in different directions.38 As above, the assumption that supply shocks of the complement
are exogenous to district level differences in supply in Afghanistan means that the terms
Xt−1 and qCt−1 are captured by year-fixed effects τt and can be dropped. This results in
the following equation:
pCt−1 = DSt +$ × η
D∑
d=1
suitd ×OVt−1 + Ot−1 + Ct−1. (9)
with $ ∼ U [0, 1] being the degree to which supply side shocks to opium affect the price
of the complement(s). With a negative cross-price-elasticity, as for complement goods,
it holds that $ > 0, i.e., a positive supply shock to the good decreases the price of
the good, and increases demand and the price of the complement. The error term is
Ct−1 ∼ N (0, σ2). If the additional random noise Ct becomes too large, the complement
price becomes less informative and less useful as this would dominate the former part of
the equation.
Opium and complement price:
Accordingly (focusing on those parts relevant for the coefficient estimate that are not
captured by FE), we have:
pOt−1 = DSt − η ×
D∑
d=1
suitd ×OVt−1 + Ot−1, (10)
pCt−1 = DSt +$ × η
D∑
d=1
suitd ×OVt−1 + Ot−1 + Ct−1. (11)
Subtracting Equation 10 from Equation 11 gives
pCt−1 = pOt−1 + ($ × η + η)×
D∑
d=1
suitd ×OVt−1 + Ct−1. (12)
Equation 12 shows that pC can be considered as the opium price plus a difference in the
38One simplifying assumption we make is that adjustment effects take time, for instance until the next
year. Over time, the quantity of the complement that is produced will of course adjust to the higher
price and increase as well, which will limit the price increase until a new equilibrium is reached. It
also matters whether a supply shock is temporary or persistent.
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bias and an iid error term Ct−1, which we can treat as additional random measurement
error in a regression on conflict. We can then write the prices at the district-year level
using Equation 10 and Equation 11 as
pOd,t = DSt − η × suitd ∗OVt−1 + Od,t−1, (13)
pCd,t = DSt +$ × η × suitd ×OVt−1 + Cd,t−1. (14)
We can then compare the three estimating equations
conflictd,t = bTrue(1) × pOt−1 × suitd + γ × suitd ×OVt−1 + τt + δd + ϑd,t, (15)
conflictd,t = bOpium(2) × pOt−1 × suitd + τt + δd + ϑOd,t, (16)
conflictd,t = bComplement(3) × pCt−1 × suitd + τt + δd + ϑCd,t. (17)
Equation 15 is the “true” regression and Equations 16 and 17 “short” equations in the
sense Angrist and Pischke (2008) use true and short. Short equations do not capture the
effect of the omitted variable, and thus yield biased coefficients b. Inserting the terms
from above yields
conflictd,t = bTrue(1) × pOt−1 × suitd + γ × suitd ×OVt−1 + τt + δd + ϑd,t, (18)
conflictd,t = bOpium(2) × (DSt − η × suitd ×OVt−1 + Ct−1)× suitd + τt + δd + ϑOd,t, (19)
conflictd,t = bComplement(3) × (DSt +$ × η × suitd ×OVt−1 + Ct−1)× suitd + τt + δd + ϑCd,t.
(20)
This means the coefficients in the short regressions are
bOpium = β − η × suitd ×OVt−1 + ϑOd,t,
bComplement = β + ($ × η × suitd ×OVt−1)− β × σ
C
σC + σC
+ ϑCd,t.
The expectation for the coefficients when regressing both prices in the short regressions
on conflict are
E[bOpium] = β + γ × ρ(opiumpricet−1 × suitd, OVt−1 × suitd)Var(opiumpricet−1 × suitd) (21)
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and
E[bComplement] = β − β × σ
C
σC + σC
+ (−$)× γ × ρ(opiumpricet−1 × suitd, OVt−1 × suitd)Var(opiumpricet−1 × suitd)
=⇒
E[bComplement] = β × σ
C
σC + σC
−$ × γ × ρ(opiumpricet−1 × suitd, OVt−1 × suitd)Var(opiumpricet−1 × suitd) . (22)
The first term in Equation 22 indicates the attenuation bias, moving the coefficient
towards zero, as the complement price is only a noisy proxy for the opium price. The
second term shows that a potential omitted variable bias points in the opposite direction
for the two prices, as −$ ≤ 0 and $ ∼ U [0, 1]. We can see that if $ = 0, the estimate
would not be affected by omitted variable bias at all; it would however also not be
informative about the opium price. For the case $ = 1, i.e., perfect complements in the
sense that the good’s price reacts to changes in the supply of the complement as strong
as to changes in its own supply, the omitted variable bias would point in the opposite
direction and be of exactly equal size for both prices.
Equations 21 and 22 make it very obvious which properties we would want from a
“useful” complement.
• Common demand shifters must affect both prices simultaneously, so that σC
σC+σC
remains close to 1, i.e., the complement price is informative about the opium price.
• Supply side shocks to the complement must be exogenous to suitability-specific
shocks in Afghanistan such that we can ignore their influence for the estimation.
We can conclude the following:
• Estimates using the complement price will be attenuated towards zero, making it
less likely to find a significant effect.
• Omitted variable bias shifts both coefficients in opposite directions. Accordingly, if
the true effect is zero, one of the estimates should be larger, and one smaller than
zero. It is unlikely that both are negative (or positive), if the true effect is not
negative or positive (Scenario A and B in the simulation below).
• If both coefficients are negative (positive) and the opium coefficient is more negative
(positive), this indicates a downward (upward) bias in the opium coefficient. The
complement coefficient is an upper (lower) bound of the true negative (positive)
effect (Scenario C in the simulation below).
19
• If both coefficients are negative (positive) and the complement coefficient is
more negative (positive), this indicates an upward (downward) bias in the opium
coefficient. The opium coefficient is an upper (lower) bound of the true negative
(positive) effect (Scenario D in the simulation below).
Taken together, our exercise serves two purposes. First, we can test whether both
coefficients are significantly larger or smaller than zero. If this is the case, we can be
confident about the sign of the true effect. In addition we can test which coefficient is
further away from zero to assess the direction of OVB and estimate an upper or lower
bound of the true effect.
We can also illustrate and show this using a simulation. In a Monte Carlo simulation,
we can draw parameters from general distributions to account for the fact that we do not
know the true cross-price elasticity, the size of random errors, and the degree to which
omitted variables influence the endogenous parameter.
Simulation:
The Monte Carlo approach simulates four different scenarios, which vary by featuring
an upward or downward bias and by having a true estimate that is either 0 or -1. As
we cannot observe the true data generating process, we simulate a very general data
generating process to assess the validity of our approach. We assume for the common
demand shifters DSt ∼ |N (0, σ2)|. Moreover, we use η ∼ U [0, 1] for different degrees of
endogeneity and $ ∼ |N (0, σ2)| for different cross-price elasticities.
The outcome, conflict in district d at time t is then
conflictd,t = α+ βTrue × drug pricet−1 × suitd + τt + δd+
γ × suitd ×OVt−1 + ϑd,t,
(23)
with ϑd,t ∼ N (0, σ2). We add a positive constant α to always ensure a positive outcome,
but this is not necessary and not biasing the results. In each round, we draw 1000
observations, clustered in 100 districts with 10 time periods, and compute all variables.
We then in each row estimate the following.
conflictd,t = bTrue(1) × pOt−1 × suitd + γ × suitd ×OVt−1 + τt + δd + ϑd,t, (24)
conflictd,t = bOpium(2) × pOt−1 × suitd + τt + δd + ϑOd,t, (25)
conflictd,t = bComplement(3) × pCt−1 × suitd + τt + δd + ϑCd,t. (26)
We want to understand how the likelihood that bcomplement < bopium depends on
the direction of omitted variable bias and how likely it is that both point estimates
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significantly differ from the true parameter value.
The simulation is repeated 5,000 times and we store b1, b2 and b3 in each round, as well
as SE1, SE2 and SE3, and pval1, pval2 and pval3. We then compute the likelihood that
across all these different data generating processes i) the estimates using complement
prices are more negative than the estimates using opium prices, ii) both prices yield
a negative point estimate, and iii) both prices yield a negative point estimate and are
significantly different from the true parameter value at the 5% level. These estimations
are run for four different cases:
A. β = 0 and γ = 1.
B. β = 0 and γ = −1.
C. β = −1 and γ = 1.
D. β = −1 and γ = −1.
The implications would be the same for positive values of β. The simulation results verify
the two main insights from above. First, if the true parameter value is 0, the likelihood
that both the estimate using opium and using the complement are significantly smaller
than zero is comparable to the false rejection rate. In simple terms, under rather general
conditions it is extremely unlikely that both estimates would be significantly negative if
the true effect is 0. Second, if the true parameter value is -1, we can compare the point
estimates using the complement and the opium price to assess the direction of potential
omitted variable bias. If the estimate using the opium price is downward biased, it is
extremely unlikely that the point estimate using the complement price is more negative.
If the point estimate using the complement price is in such a scenario more negative,
the likelihood that both estimates are more negative than the true parameter value is
extremely small. Our estimations reveal that both point estimates are negative and
significantly different from zero with small p-values, and that the point estimate using
the complement price is more negative. Thus, it is extremely unlikely that the true
parameter value is equal or larger than zero, and it is likely that the estimates using the
opium price is an upper bound of the true negative effect. Table 12 shows these results
in detail for the scenarios A to D. Based on the table and Figures 12 and 13, scenario D
seems to fit our data best. In that case, the estimate using the opium price is an upper
bound of the true negative effect.
More specifically, the table and figures illustrate several important aspects. The
figures clearly illustrate the differences between using the opium price or a complement
price. First, we can see that in the majority of cases one of the estimates is higher, and
one lower than the true value. Consequently, testing whether both are more positive or
negative than 0 (or any value Z ) is a good indication about the direction of the causal
effect (or it being higher or lower than Z ). It is apparent that the estimates using the
complement are more dispersed and on average closer to zero. The dispersion comes
from draws with a weaker cross-price elasticity, in which case the relationship with the
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treatment and outcome are also weaker. The estimates are closer to zero compared to
the opium estimates due to attenuation (see Equation 22).
The first rows of Table 12 verify that the simulation works as intended. The parameter
estimates using the true regression is close to the true relationship, the hypothesis of
it being different is only rejected at the 5% level in 5% of the cases, about equal to
the false rejection rate (row 4). Due to the omitted variable bias that we created, the
estimates of the “short” regressions using opium or the complement alone differ quite
often significantly from the true β. So how to make use of this strategy? First, one
can check whether the estimate using the complement price is more negative or more
positive than the estimate using the opium price. In our case it is more negative, clearly
suggesting that scenario B or D (downward bias) is the relevant one for us. In B and D
this can happen in 0.965 and 0.751% of all draws, whereas in A or C only in 0.033 and
0.075% of all cases.
Scenario B is based on a true effect of 0, scenario D on a negative true effect of -
1. The second aspect we can consider is the likelihood of both estimates being more
negative than the true effect. Rows 6 and 7 show that the likelihood that both are more
negative is around 10% only, the likelihood that they are both significantly more negative
even smaller.39 As in our case, the estimate using the complement is more negative than
using opium, we are also interested in the likelihood that this happens and both are
significantly more negative than the true value. The last row shows that this likelihood
is about equal to the false rejection rate.40
This is what we exploit in our case. First, estimates using opium (international heroin)
prices, as well as prices using cocaine and an index of three complements are all negative.
Consequently, it is unlikely that the true effect is not negative. Second, because both
complement estimates are more negative, the (less negative) estimate using opium serves
as an upper bound for the true negative effect. This is best visible in the right hand side
of Figure 13.
39 This likelihood is slightly higher with an upward bias in scenario A or C as we focus here on the
likelihood of estimates being more negative. Considering simply whether both are significantly different
(positive or negative), yields similar values for all scenarios.
40 0.073 and 0.008, close to 5% if the true value is 0, and 0.032 and 0.028 if the true value is -1. This
is due to the fact that in the former case (B) both “short” estimates are more often negative than in
the latter case (D). The reasons is the attenuation of the complement estimate towards zero, making
it less likely to be more negative than -1 in scenario D.
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Table 12
Simulation
A B C D
β=0 & β=0 & β=-1 & β=-1 &
Downward bias Upward bias Downward bias Upward bias
(1) (2) (3) (4)
b¯(true) -0.000 0.001 -0.999 -1.000
b¯(opium) -0.369 0.374 -1.369 -0.633
b¯(complement) 0.248 -0.247 -0.296 -0.802
p [b(true) 6=< β] 0.051 0.052 0.048 0.051
b(opium)) < β ∧ b(complement) < β 0.232 0.110 0.221 0.102
p [ b(complement) < β ∧ b(opium) <β] 0.087 0.036 0.091 0.035
b(opium) < b(complement) 0.967 0.035 0.925 0.249
b(opium) < b(complement) < β 0.018 0.099 0.069 0.057
p [ b(opium)< b(complement) < β] 0.015 0.028 0.065 0.010
b(complement) < b(opium) 0.033 0.965 0.075 0.751
b(complement)< b(opium) < β 0.214 0.011 0.151 0.045
p [ b(complement)< b(opium) < β] 0.073 0.008 0.032 0.028
Notes: Simulations with 5’000 repetitions. b(true) is the estimate from the true regression, i.e., one taking account of omitted variable bias (upward or
downward). b(opium) is the estimate using the opium price, and b(complement) using the complement price. Row five gives an idea in which scenario we
are in, looking at whether the estimate using opium or its complement is more negative. Combining row 5 and rows 8 and 9 indicates the likelihood of both
estimates being negative given an upward or downward bias scenario. p( ) indicates that coefficient estimates are significantly different/more negative than
the true value at the 5% level.
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Figure 12
Simulations with true parameter estimate β=0. A: Upward bias, left side, B: Downward bias, right side
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Figure 13
Simulations with true parameter estimate β=-1. C: Upward bias, left side, D: Downward bias, right side
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E. Further results
Different timing of the shocks
Table 13
Leads and lags, 2002-2014
Wheat shock: Wheat shock:
Not included (t-1)
(1) (2)
Opium Profitability (t+1) -0.066 0.011
(0.251) (0.254)
Opium Profitability (t) -0.660** -0.670**
(0.320) (0.319)
Opium Profitability (t-1) -0.773*** -0.585*
(0.289) (0.314)
Number of observations 4776 4776
Adjusted R-squared 0.648 0.649
Notes: Linear probability models with province-times-year- and district-fixed effects. The dependent
variable is the logarithm of BRD in (t). Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district
level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01
Table 14
Timing of shocks, 2002-2014
(log) BRD 1 if ≥ 5 1 if ≥ 10 1 if ≥ 25 1 if ≥ 100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Contemporaneous effect
Opium Profitability (t) -0.608** -0.168** -0.161** -0.130* -0.021
(0.246) (0.075) (0.074) (0.066) (0.033)
Wheat Shock (t) 0.443*** 0.092* 0.115*** 0.064* 0.010
(0.154) (0.050) (0.043) (0.038) (0.024)
Number of observations 5174 5174 5174 5174 5174
Adjusted R-Squared 0.649 0.501 0.483 0.454 0.310
Panel B: Lagged effect
Opium Profitability (t-1) -0.675** -0.167* -0.191** -0.147* -0.040
(0.296) (0.090) (0.085) (0.075) (0.037)
Wheat Shock (t-1) 0.307** 0.088** 0.077** 0.034 -0.010
(0.123) (0.039) (0.036) (0.031) (0.019)
Number of observations 5174 5174 5174 5174 5174
Adjusted R-Squared 0.649 0.501 0.484 0.454 0.310
Notes: Linear probability models with province-times-year- and district-fixed effects. The dependent
variable is conflict in (t) operationalized as indicated in the column heading. Standard errors are in
parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01
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Types of fighting
Table 15
Types of fighting, 2002-2014
Conflict Actor: All Taleb.-Civil. Taleb.-Gov.
BRD: Any Both Both Taleb. Gov.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Opium Profitability (t-1) -0.675** -0.098 -0.677** -0.539*** -0.521*
(0.296) (0.069) (0.302) (0.187) (0.274)
Wheat Shock (t-1) 0.307** 0.012 0.362*** 0.134* 0.257**
(0.123) (0.026) (0.124) (0.079) (0.115)
Number of observations 5174 5174 5174 5174 5174
Adjusted R-Squared 0.649 0.200 0.658 0.555 0.596
Notes: Linear probability models with province-times-year- and district-fixed effects. The dependent
variable is the log of BRD in (t) for a specific type of conflict operationalized as indicated in the
column heading. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance
levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01
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Regressions at the province level
Table 16
Effect of income shocks on opium revenues, province level, 2002-2014
Outcome: (t) Outcome: (t) and (t-1)
(1) (2)
Opium Profitability (t-1) 5.885* 5.461*
(3.199) (3.074)
Wheat Shock (t-1) 2.238 2.184
(1.901) (2.030)
Number of observations 442 442
Adjusted R-Squared 0.609 0.679
Notes: Linear probability models with province- and year-fixed effects. The dependent variable
opium revenues in (t) is in logarithms. Standard errors clustered at the province level are displayed
in parentheses. Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01.
Table 17
Normalized drug prices, province level, 2002-2014
Local Opium International Complement International
Price Heroin Price Price Cocaine Price
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Opium Profitability (t-1) -0.290 -0.717 -1.101* -0.661*
(0.299) (0.566) (0.647) (0.368)
Wheat Shock (t-1) 0.083 -0.027 -0.179 -0.105
(0.385) (0.404) (0.401) (0.409)
Number of observations 442 442 442 442
Adjusted R-Squared 0.723 0.724 0.726 0.726
Notes: Linear probability models with province- and year-fixed effects. The dependent variable is
the log of BRD in (t). Opium Profitability is defined as the interaction between the normalized
drug prices (in logarithms) as indicated in the column heading and the suitability to grow opium.
Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the province level). Significance levels: * 0.10 **
0.05 *** 0.01.
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Regressions at the household level: Living standards
Table 18
Living standard indicators, household level, 2002-2014
(1) (2) (3)
Dietary Calorie Food
Diversity Intake Insecurity
Panel A: Food consumption
Opium Profitability (t-1) 0.571** 143.915 0.182*
(0.289) (256.750) (0.110)
Wheat Shock (t-1) 0.144 103.729 -0.000
(0.124) (98.066) (0.035)
Number of observations 72224 71634 71634
Adjusted R-Squared 0.371 0.139 0.197
Panel B: Food expenditures
Food Exp. Food Exp. Food Exp.
Paasche adj. Laspeyres adj.
Opium Profitability (t-1) 698.905** 788.172** 750.822**
(303.057) (312.228) (314.647)
Wheat Shock (t-1) 346.351*** 366.635*** 263.161**
(109.688) (110.396) (112.203)
Number of observations 72643 72643 72635
Adjusted R-Squared 0.225 0.196 0.217
Panel C: Assets
Sum of Sum of Economically
Assets Assets weighted improved
Opium Profitability (t-1) 0.925*** 0.614*** 0.431*
(0.327) (0.217) (0.225)
Wheat Shock (t-1) -0.066 -0.015 -0.228***
(0.112) (0.072) (0.082)
Number of observations 72447 66620 70670
Adjusted R-Squared 0.323 0.336 0.249
Notes: Linear probability models with province-times-year- and district-fixed effects. The dependent
variable in (t) is operationalized as indicated in the column heading. Opium Profitability is defined as
the interaction between the normalized international heroin price (in logarithms) and the suitability
to grow opium. All food expenditures are in 2011 prices. Standard errors are in parentheses
(clustered at the district-year level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01.
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Figure 14
Effect of opium profitability (t-1) on living standard indicators in (t), accounting for
household survey weights
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Notes: The figure shows results of 7 separate regressions in analogy to Table 18. The difference is that
we include household survey weights in the regressions. Results are also robust to using robust standard
errors rather than clustering at the district-year level.
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F. Sensitivity analysis
Empirical model
Table 19
Normalized prices, district- and year-fixed effects, 2002-2014
(log) BRD 1 if ≥ 5 1 if ≥ 10 1 if ≥ 25 1 if ≥ 100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Local Opium Price
Opium Profitability (t-1) -0.280*** -0.097*** -0.078*** -0.026 0.000
(0.091) (0.028) (0.026) (0.021) (0.012)
Wheat Shock (t-1) 0.318*** 0.084*** 0.074** 0.049* 0.010
(0.106) (0.032) (0.030) (0.026) (0.015)
Number of observations 5174 5174 5174 5174 5174
Adjusted R-Squared 0.562 0.423 0.410 0.389 0.264
Panel B: International Heroin Price (Baseline)
Opium Profitability (t-1) -0.451** -0.132** -0.122* -0.050 -0.010
(0.209) (0.064) (0.063) (0.051) (0.023)
Wheat Shock (t-1) 0.289*** 0.080** 0.067** 0.044* 0.008
(0.110) (0.032) (0.031) (0.027) (0.016)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.561 0.421 0.409 0.389 0.264
Panel C: Complement Price
Opium Profitability (t-1) -0.707*** -0.217*** -0.172*** -0.091* -0.028
(0.222) (0.068) (0.064) (0.050) (0.023)
Wheat Shock (t-1) 0.207* 0.053 0.050 0.032 0.003
(0.114) (0.033) (0.032) (0.028) (0.016)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.563 0.423 0.410 0.390 0.264
Panel D: International Cocaine Price
Opium Profitability (t-1) -0.363*** -0.102** -0.088** -0.046 -0.012
(0.138) (0.042) (0.041) (0.034) (0.015)
Wheat Shock (t-1) 0.268** 0.075** 0.065** 0.040 0.006
(0.108) (0.032) (0.030) (0.026) (0.016)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.562 0.422 0.410 0.390 0.264
Notes: Linear probability models with year- and district-fixed effects. The dependent variable is
conflict in (t) operationalized as indicated in the column heading. Opium Profitability is defined
as the interaction between the normalized drug prices (in logarithms) and the suitability to grow
opium. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: *
0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01.
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Table 20
Conditional logit: incidence, onset and ending, 2002-2014
1 if ≥ 5 1 if ≥ 10 1 if ≥ 25 1 if ≥ 100
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Incidence
Opium Profitability (t-1) -6.376*** -6.823*** -6.849** -3.148
(1.764) (2.519) (3.249) (6.672)
Wheat Shock (t-1) -0.171 2.204** 2.631* 1.154
(1.087) (1.117) (1.466) (3.084)
Number of observations 4407 3510 2431 806
Pseudo R-Squared 0.350 0.272 0.272 0.213
Panel B: Onset
Opium Profitability (t-1) -4.505*** -6.076** -5.729* -1.719
(1.686) (2.375) (3.092) (5.601)
Wheat Shock (t-1) 1.062 2.860*** 1.725 0.162
(1.020) (1.109) (1.424) (2.721)
Number of observations 2953 2739 1995 714
Pseudo R-Squared 0.170 0.136 0.149 0.149
Panel C: Ending
Opium Profitability (t-1) 4.053** 0.445 -0.446 -9.784
(1.698) (2.430) (2.939) (8.124)
Wheat Shock (t-1) 0.363 -0.457 -1.357 -1.915
(1.150) (1.558) (2.059) (4.696)
Number of observations 1931 1195 730 207
Pseudo R-Squared 0.105 0.077 0.102 0.161
Notes: Conditional logit model with year- and district-fixed effects. The dependent variable is
conflict onset/ending in (t) operationalized as indicated in the column heading. Opium Profitability
is defined as the interaction between the normalized international heroin price (in logarithms) and
the suitability to grow opium. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level).
Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01
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Modifications of the treatment variable: Drug prices
Table 21
Non-normalized drug prices, 2002-2014
(log) BRD 1 if ≥ 5 1 if ≥ 10 1 if ≥ 25 1 if ≥ 100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Local Opium Price
Opium Profitability (t-1) -0.644*** -0.166*** -0.165*** -0.143*** -0.079***
(0.200) (0.059) (0.056) (0.052) (0.030)
Wheat Shock (t-1) 0.341*** 0.095** 0.090** 0.041 -0.016
(0.121) (0.038) (0.035) (0.031) (0.017)
Number of observations 5174 5174 5174 5174 5174
Adjusted R-Squared 0.650 0.502 0.484 0.454 0.311
Panel B: International Heroin Price (Baseline)
Opium Profitability (t-1) -2.103** -0.503* -0.550** -0.465** -0.183*
(0.835) (0.256) (0.233) (0.206) (0.108)
Wheat Shock (t-1) 0.289** 0.085** 0.075** 0.030 -0.016
(0.128) (0.040) (0.037) (0.033) (0.020)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.649 0.501 0.483 0.454 0.310
Panel C: Complement Price
Opium Profitability (t-1) -4.023*** -1.016** -0.982*** -0.870*** -0.371**
(1.337) (0.399) (0.364) (0.329) (0.176)
Wheat Shock (t-1) 0.221* 0.065 0.062* 0.016 -0.023
(0.130) (0.040) (0.037) (0.033) (0.020)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.651 0.502 0.484 0.455 0.311
Panel D: International Cocaine Price
Opium Profitability (t-1) -3.594*** -0.888** -0.871*** -0.780** -0.318**
(1.229) (0.363) (0.334) (0.302) (0.159)
Wheat Shock (t-1) 0.220* 0.066* 0.062 0.015 -0.023
(0.130) (0.040) (0.038) (0.033) (0.020)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.651 0.502 0.484 0.455 0.311
Notes: Linear probability models with province-times-year- and district-fixed effects. The dependent
variable is conflict in (t) operationalized as indicated in the column heading. Opium Profitability is
defined as the interaction between the drug prices (in logarithms) and the suitability to grow opium.
Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05
*** 0.01.
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Table 22
International heroin price, price not in logarithms, 2002-2014
(log) BRD 1 if ≥ 5 1 if ≥ 10 1 if ≥ 25 1 if ≥ 100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Opium Profitability (t-1) -6.970*** -1.665** -1.781*** -1.438*** -0.553**
(2.232) (0.696) (0.618) (0.537) (0.277)
Wheat Shock (t-1) 0.853** 0.250** 0.222** 0.107 -0.037
(0.354) (0.112) (0.106) (0.092) (0.050)
Number of observations 5174 5174 5174 5174 5174
Adjusted R-squared 0.649 0.501 0.483 0.454 0.310
Notes: Linear probability models with province-times-year- and district-fixed effects. The dependent
variable is conflict in (t) operationalized as indicated in the column heading. Opium Profitability is
defined as the interaction between the normalized international price (prices are not in logarithms)
and the suitability to grow opium. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district
level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01.
Table 23
International heroin price in deviations, 2002-2014
(log) BRD 1 if ≥ 5 1 if ≥ 10 1 if ≥ 25 1 if ≥ 100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Opium Profitability (t-1) -6.197* -1.434 -1.567* -1.387* -0.620*
(3.136) (0.875) (0.887) (0.747) (0.350)
Wheat Shock (t-1) 0.303** 0.089*** 0.080** 0.032 -0.017
(0.122) (0.031) (0.036) (0.027) (0.020)
Number of observations 5174 5174 5174 5174 5174
Adjusted R-Squared 0.649 0.501 0.483 0.453 0.310
Notes: Linear probability models with province-times-year- and district-fixed effects. The dependent
variable is conflict in (t) operationalized as indicated in the column heading. Opium Profitability is
defined as the interaction between international price deviations (from the mean) and the suitability
to grow opium. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance
levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01.
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Modifications of the treatment variable: Suitability
Table 24
Unweighted suitabilities, 2002-2014
(log) BRD 1 if ≥ 5 1 if ≥ 10 1 if ≥ 25 1 if ≥ 100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Opium Profitability (t-1) -0.988*** -0.249*** -0.244*** -0.188** -0.031
(0.290) (0.093) (0.088) (0.077) (0.041)
Wheat Shock (t-1) 0.173 0.036 0.049 0.014 0.006
(0.149) (0.043) (0.043) (0.040) (0.024)
Number of observations 5174 5174 5174 5174 5174
Adjusted R-squared 0.650 0.501 0.483 0.454 0.310
Notes: Linear probability models with province-times-year- and district-fixed effects. The dependent
variable is conflict in (t) operationalized as indicated in the column heading. Opium Profitability
is defined as the interaction between the normalized international prices (in logarithms) and the
unweighted suitability to grow opium (in analogy for wheat). Standard errors are in parentheses
(clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01.
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Modifications of the treatment variable: Dyadic DiD
Table 25
DiD, dyadic treatment, 2002-2014
(log) BRD 1 if ≥ 5 1 if ≥ 10 1 if ≥ 25 1 if ≥ 100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Suitability dichotomized
Opium Profitability (t-1) -0.229*** -0.052* -0.041 -0.042* -0.017
(0.087) (0.027) (0.026) (0.022) (0.013)
Wheat Shock (t-1) 0.072 0.027* 0.026* 0.007 -0.014**
(0.051) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.006)
Number of observations 5174 5174 5174 5174 5174
Adjusted R-Squared 0.648 0.500 0.482 0.453 0.311
Panel B: Suitability and Heroin Price dichotomized
Opium Profitability (t-1) -0.397*** -0.107*** -0.090** -0.071** -0.029
(0.117) (0.038) (0.035) (0.030) (0.018)
Wheat Shock (t-1) 0.099 0.029 0.043 0.007 -0.025**
(0.092) (0.028) (0.029) (0.024) (0.012)
Number of observations 5174 5174 5174 5174 5174
Adjusted R-Squared 0.649 0.501 0.483 0.453 0.311
Notes: Linear probability models with province-times-year- and district-fixed effects. The dependent
variable is conflict in (t) operationalized as indicated in the column heading. Suitability (for opium
and wheat) dichotomized according to the sample median in panel A. Suitability (for opium and
wheat) and international prices (for heroin and wheat) dichotomized according to the sample median
in panel B. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: *
0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01.
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Outcome and timing (Reduced form and IV)
Table 26
Effect of income shocks on opium cultivation, 2002-2014
Outcome: (t) Outcome: (t)+(t-1)
(1) (2)
Opium Profitability (t-1) 0.483 0.705**
(0.307) (0.308)
Wheat Shock (t-1) -0.173 -0.070
(0.171) (0.168)
Number of observations 5174 5174
Adjusted R-Squared 0.399 0.488
Notes: The dependent variables opium cultivation is in logarithms. Column 1 presents lagged
effects. Column 2 reports lagged and contemporaneous effects by defining the outcome as the
moving average, i.e., (revenues(t)+revenues(t-1))/2. Opium Profitability is defined as the interaction
between the normalized drug prices (in logarithms) and the suitability to grow opium. Standard
errors clustered at the district level are displayed in parentheses. Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05
*** 0.01.
Table 27
IVs for opium cultivation, 2002-2014
(log) BRD 1 if ≥ 5 1 if ≥ 10 1 if ≥ 25 1 if ≥ 100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Second Stages
Opium Profitability (t-1) and VHI (t-1) as IVs
(log) Cultivation (t-1) -0.469** -0.132** -0.125** -0.083* -0.022
(0.213) (0.063) (0.063) (0.048) (0.022)
Number of observations 5173 5173 5173 5173 5173
Kleibergen-Paap F stat. 9.947 9.947 9.947 9.947 9.947
Hansen J p-val. 0.708 0.644 0.724 0.448 0.496
Panel B: First Stages
Cultivation in (t-1)
Opium Profitability (t-1) 0.811*** 0.811*** 0.811*** 0.811*** 0.811***
(0.260) (0.260) (0.260) (0.260) (0.260)
VHI (t-1) -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.385 0.385 0.385 0.385 0.385
Notes: Linear probability models with year- and district-fixed effects. The dependent variable
is conflict in (t) operationalized as indicated in the column heading. Opium cultivation is in (t-
1). Opium Profitability (t-1) and VHI (t-1) are used as IVs. Standard errors are in parentheses
(clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01.
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Table 28
IVs for opium revenues, 2002-2014
(log) BRD 1 if ≥ 5 1 if ≥ 10 1 if ≥ 25 1 if ≥ 100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Opium Price Shock (t-1) as IV
(log) Revenue:(t)+(t-1) -0.173* -0.049* -0.045 -0.020 -0.004
(0.099) (0.030) (0.030) (0.022) (0.010)
Number of observations 5085 5085 5085 5085 5085
Kleibergen-Paap F stat. 11.047 11.047 11.047 11.047 11.047
Panel B: VHI (t-1) as IV
(log) Revenue:(t)+(t-1) -0.374 -0.099 -0.099 -0.105 -0.032
(0.299) (0.084) (0.084) (0.079) (0.033)
Number of observations 5084 5084 5084 5084 5084
Kleibergen-Paap F stat. 2.610 2.610 2.610 2.610 2.610
Panel C: Opium Price Shock and VHI (t-1) as IVs
(log) Revenue:(t)+(t-1) -0.193** -0.054* -0.051* -0.029 -0.007
(0.098) (0.029) (0.029) (0.021) (0.010)
Number of observations 5084 5084 5084 5084 5084
Kleibergen-Paap F stat. 6.170 6.170 6.170 6.170 6.170
Hansen J p-val. 0.374 0.464 0.413 0.079 0.266
Notes: Linear probability models with year- and district-fixed effects. The dependent variable is
conflict in (t) operationalized as indicated in the column heading. Opium revenues is operationalized
as the moving average between (t) and (t-1). Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the
district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01.
Table 29
Corresponding first stage results for revenues (t)+(t-1), 2002-2014
Opium VHI Opium Profitability,
Profitability and VHI
(1) (2) (3)
Opium Profitability (t-1) 2.489*** 2.436***
(0.749) (0.748)
VHI (t-1) -0.007 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004)
Notes: Linear probability models with year- and district-fixed effects. The dependent variable is
opium revenues. Opium revenues is operationalized as the moving average between (t) and (t-1).
The corresponding IVs are indicated in the column heading. Standard errors are in parentheses
(clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01.
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Table 30
Alternative IVs for revenue (t-1), 2002-2014
(log) BRD 1 if ≥ 5 1 if ≥ 10 1 if ≥ 25 1 if ≥ 100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Opium Profitability (t-1) and VHI (t-1) as IVs
(log) Revenue (t-1) -0.162** -0.045** -0.042** -0.027* -0.007
(0.071) (0.021) (0.021) (0.016) (0.008)
Number of observations 5103 5103 5103 5103 5103
Kleibergen-Paap F stat. 11.753 11.753 11.753 11.753 11.753
Hansen J p-val. 0.800 0.896 0.806 0.226 0.371
Panel B: Legal Opioids (t-1) as IVs
(log) Revenue (t-1) -0.193** -0.058** -0.046* -0.025 -0.009
(0.086) (0.025) (0.024) (0.017) (0.007)
Number of observations 5104 5104 5104 5104 5104
Kleibergen-Paap F stat. 13.050 13.050 13.050 13.050 13.050
Panel C: Legal Opioids (t-1) and VHI (t-1) as IVs
(log) Revenue (t-1) -0.192** -0.056** -0.046** -0.030* -0.010
(0.075) (0.022) (0.021) (0.016) (0.007)
Number of observations 5103 5103 5103 5103 5103
Kleibergen-Paap F stat. 10.431 10.431 10.431 10.431 10.431
Hansen J p-val. 0.947 0.819 0.943 0.334 0.596
Notes: Linear probability models with year- and district-fixed effects. The dependent variable is
conflict in (t) operationalized as indicated in the column heading. Opium revenues are in (t-1). The
corresponding IVs are indicated in the panel heading. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered
at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01.
Table 31
Corresponding first stage results for revenues, 2002-2014
Opium Profitability Legal Opioids Legal Opioids
and VHI and VHI
(1) (2) (3)
Opium Profitability (t-1) 2.798***
(0.721)
VHI (t-1) -0.012*** -0.011***
(0.004) (0.004)
Legal Opioids (t-1) -15.384*** -14.878***
(4.259) (4.271)
Notes: Linear probability models with year- and district-fixed effects. The dependent variable
is opium revenue in (t-1). Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level).
Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01.
39
Standard errors
Table 32
Standard errors clustered at different levels, 2002-2014
(log) BRD 1 if ≥ 5 1 if ≥ 10 1 if ≥ 25 1 if ≥ 100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Clustered at district and year level
Opium Profitability (t-1) -0.675* -0.167 -0.191* -0.147* -0.040
(0.365) (0.103) (0.103) (0.082) (0.044)
Wheat Shock (t-1) 0.307** 0.088*** 0.077** 0.034 -0.010
(0.105) (0.025) (0.030) (0.024) (0.016)
Number of observations 5174 5174 5174 5174 5174
Adjusted R-Squared 0.649 0.501 0.484 0.453 0.310
Panel B: Clustered at province and year level
Opium shock (t-1) -0.675* -0.126 -0.191* -0.147* -0.040
(0.365) (0.104) (0.103) (0.082) (0.044)
Wheat shock (t-1) 0.307** 0.144*** 0.077** 0.034 -0.010
(0.105) (0.033) (0.030) (0.024) (0.016)
Number of observations 5174 5174 5174 5174 5174
Adjusted R-Squared 0.649 0.550 0.484 0.453 0.310
Notes: Linear probability models with province-times-year- and district-fixed effects. The dependent
variable is conflict in (t) operationalized as indicated in the column heading. Standard errors are
clustered as indicated in the panel heading. Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01
Figure 15
Wild-cluster bootstrap (clustered at the province level)
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Notes: Figures show the distribution of bootstrap estimates. The dependent variable is the (log) of
BRD. Regressions correspond to Table 2 column 1 (panels B and C). The number indicate the left
and right 95% confidence interval. The test of the the null hypothesis at the 5% level is whether this
intervall contains 0.
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Covariates and trends
Table 33
No wheat shock included, 2002-2014
(log) BRD 1 if ≥ 5 1 if ≥ 10 1 if ≥ 25 1 if ≥ 100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Opium Profitability (t-1) -0.923*** -0.238*** -0.253*** -0.175** -0.031
(0.279) (0.084) (0.079) (0.069) (0.030)
Number of observations 5174 5174 5174 5174 5174
Adjusted R-Squared 0.649 0.501 0.483 0.453 0.310
Notes: Linear probability modelswith province-times-year- and district-fixed effects. The dependent
variable is conflict in (t) operationalized as indicated in the column heading. Standard errors are in
parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01.
Table 34
Lagged dependent, 2002-2014
(log) BRD 1 if ≥ 5 1 if ≥ 10 1 if ≥ 25 1 if ≥ 100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Opium Profitability (t-1) -0.455* -0.140* -0.160** -0.102 -0.021
(0.252) (0.084) (0.076) (0.065) (0.032)
Wheat Shock (t-1) 0.260** 0.083** 0.068** 0.031 -0.008
(0.103) (0.036) (0.032) (0.027) (0.015)
Dependent (t-1) 0.236*** 0.114*** 0.153*** 0.228*** 0.207***
(0.023) (0.019) (0.023) (0.027) (0.040)
Number of observations 5174 5174 5174 5174 5174
Adjusted R-Squared 0.670 0.508 0.496 0.482 0.340
Notes: Linear probability models with province-times-year- and district-fixed effects. The dependent
variable is conflict in (t) operationalized as indicated in the column heading. Standard errors are in
parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01
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Table 35
Including covariates, 2002-2014
(log) BRD 1 if ≥ 5 1 if ≥ 10 1 if ≥ 25 1 if ≥ 100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Baseline covariates
Opium Profitability (t-1) -0.595** -0.177** -0.188** -0.132* -0.014
(0.275) (0.086) (0.082) (0.070) (0.038)
(log) Wheat shock (t-1) 0.282** 0.093** 0.077** 0.028 -0.019
(0.129) (0.041) (0.037) (0.032) (0.019)
VHI (t) 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Luminosity (t-2) 0.018 0.005 0.002 -0.003 -0.000
(0.020) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003)
(log) Population (t-2) 1.417 -0.478 0.037 0.611 0.789**
(3.472) (0.911) (0.900) (0.958) (0.308)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.650 0.501 0.483 0.453 0.311
Panel B: Baseline covariates,
time-invariant covariates×trend
Opium Profitability (t-1) -0.680** -0.182** -0.199** -0.175** -0.030
(0.269) (0.084) (0.081) (0.068) (0.039)
(log) Wheat shock (t-1) 0.269** 0.091** 0.082** 0.025 -0.016
(0.130) (0.041) (0.037) (0.032) (0.020)
VHI (t) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Luminosity (t-2) 0.014 0.004 0.002 -0.004 -0.001
(0.020) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003)
(log) Population (t-2) -0.652 -0.910 -0.719 -0.232 0.910**
(3.469) (0.948) (0.956) (0.934) (0.380)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.653 0.504 0.487 0.461 0.317
Panel C: Baseline covariates,
time-invariant covariates×time dummies
Opium Profitability (t-1) -0.754*** -0.209** -0.222** -0.186** -0.040
(0.289) (0.089) (0.087) (0.073) (0.042)
(log) Wheat shock (t-1) 0.276* 0.090** 0.081** 0.034 -0.020
(0.141) (0.043) (0.041) (0.036) (0.022)
VHI (t) -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Luminosity (t-2) 0.011 0.003 0.001 -0.005 -0.000
(0.020) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003)
(log) Population (t-2) -0.881 -0.868 -0.775 -0.352 0.860**
(3.540) (0.988) (0.978) (0.941) (0.380)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.654 0.503 0.486 0.462 0.314
Notes: Linear probability models with province-times-year- and district-fixed effects. The dependent
variable is conflict in (t) operationalized as indicated in the column heading. The set of time-invariant
covariates includes Ruggedness, Ethnic Trafficking Route, Pashtuns, Mixed Ethnic Groups, Taliban
Territory 1996, Mixed Territory 1996, Distance Linear, Distance 2D and 3D, Travel Time 2D and
3D (all distances to Kabul). The number of observation is 5173 in panel A, and 5174 in panels B
and C. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10
** 0.05 *** 0.01.
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Outlier analysis
Table 36
Drop potential outliers, 2002-2014
(log) BRD 1 if ≥ 5 1 if ≥ 10 1 if ≥ 25 1 if ≥ 100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: No border districts
Opium Profitability (t-1) -0.601** -0.160 -0.161* -0.146* -0.014
(0.304) (0.098) (0.096) (0.086) (0.055)
Wheat Shock (t-1) 0.348** 0.113** 0.106** 0.027 -0.019
(0.167) (0.052) (0.050) (0.043) (0.027)
Number of observations 3718 3718 3718 3718 3718
Adjusted R-Squared 0.678 0.523 0.513 0.483 0.342
Panel B: No Southern provinces (Kandahar and Hilmand)
Opium Profitability (t-1) -0.674** -0.174* -0.215** -0.118 -0.007
(0.311) (0.096) (0.091) (0.078) (0.033)
Wheat Shock (t-1) 0.319** 0.088** 0.072* 0.033 0.003
(0.127) (0.041) (0.038) (0.032) (0.017)
Number of observations 4732 4732 4732 4732 4732
Adjusted R-Squared 0.620 0.480 0.458 0.407 0.255
Notes: Linear probability models with province-times-year- and district-fixed effects. The dependent
variable is conflict in (t) operationalized as indicated in the column heading. In panel A all border
districts are exlcuded and in panel B all districts in the two provinces Kandahar and Hilmand are
excluded. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: *
0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01.
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Figure 16
Leave one out - year and province
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Notes: This figure shows results for 47 separate regressions in analogy to panel B’s column 1 of
Table 2, where we leave out one year or one province at the time. This also alleviates concerns
whether particular outliers in the cross-sectional variation drive our result.
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Randomization
Figure 17
Randomization: Heroin price and opium suitability
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Panel B: Randomized Districts within Years
Notes: This figure plots the distribution of the coefficients generated by 5’000 randomizations, with
panel A randomly reordering prices across years within districts and multiplying with the actual
suitability and panel B reordering the suitability across districts and multiplying with the actual price
in the respective yes. Based on the regression model in panel B’s column 1 of Table 2. For this placebo
test, we want to see whether the randomized coefficients are centered around zero, and what share of
the draws turn out to be more negative than the actual treatment coefficient. This share is used to
compute the randomization inference p-value shown in the bottom of the graph.
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Robustness for Table 4 and Table 5
Table 37
Opportunities costs proxied by share of value added, 2002-2014
Market Acess Market Acess Sum Markets
Population 2D Population 3D and Lab
(1) (2) (3)
Opium Profitability (t-1) -0.6533** -0.6534** -0.5368*
(0.3027) (0.3027) (0.3015)
Opium Profitability (t-1)*X -0.2188 -0.0002 -0.1882
(0.2678) (0.0003) (0.1292)
Number of observations 5174 5174 5174
Adjusted R-Squared 0.649 0.649 0.650
Notes: Linear probability models with province-times-year- and district-fixed effects. The dependent
variable is the log of battle-related deaths in (t). Opium Profitability is defined as the interaction
between the normalized international heroin price (in logarithms) and the suitability to grow opium.
Regressions include interactions of the opium profitability with a variable X as indicated in in
the column heading. For definitions of the variables X see Appendix A. Standard errors are in
parentheses (clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01
Table 38
Ethnic groups measured by NRVA, 2002-2014
Any Share Ethnic Groups
Pasthuns Pasthuns 1 if Mixed Number
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Opium Profitability (t-1) -0.062 -0.283 -0.403 -0.380
(0.402) (0.359) (0.380) (0.529)
Opium Profitability (t-1)*X -1.157*** -1.005* -0.524 -0.179
(0.433) (0.577) (0.423) (0.223)
Notes: Linear probability models with province-times-year- and district-fixed effects. The dependent
variable is the log of battle-related deaths in (t). Opium Profitability is defined as the interaction
between the normalized international heroin price (in logarithms) and the suitability to grow opium.
Regressions include interactions of the opium profitability with a variable X as indicated in in the
column heading. For definitions of the variables X see Appendix A. For this table the different
measures on ethnic groups are derived from the NRVA 2003, which is not nationally representative,
but serves as a suitable proxy for ethnic group distribution. Standard errors are in parentheses
(clustered at the district level). Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01
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Robustness for Figure 8.
Figure 18
Variation in conflict across high and low suitable districts over time
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Notes: To assign a district to low or high suitability, this figure uses an alternative cut-off of 0.3.
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G. Additional maps
Figure 19
Opium suitability, opium markets, and processing labs
Notes: The figure plots the population weighted suitability. Market and lab information based on
UNODC. Opium suitability based on Kienberger et al. (2017).
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Figure 20
Ethnic groups
Notes: Distribution of ethnic groups (homelands) in Afghanistan. Note that these are partly
overlapping polygons, i.e., some districts feature more than one group even though this is not
visible in the map, but we account for this in later estimations. Source: GREG (Weidmann et al.,
2010).
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Figure 21
Road network
Notes: The road network in Afghanistan distinguishing in highways (assumed speed 120km/h), rural
roads (ass. speed 90 km/h), and urban roads (ass. speed 50 km/h). The distinction in road types
and the choice of average speed is not decisive for our results.
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Figure 22
Elevation, 2D and 3D route
Notes: The intensity of black indicates the elevation in Afghanistan. The white-black dashed line
shows the shortest road distance between to district centroids. The second white/black line indicates
the shortest distance when accounting for elevation differences along the roads. In particular the
central part of Afghanistan is very mountainous, which can have a large effect on transportation
costs and travel time.
Figure 23
Distribution of objective and subjective conflict indicators, 2002-2014
(a) Number of battle-related deaths (UCDP
GED)
(b) Share of households experiencing
insecurity shock (NRVA)
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Figure 24
Political control in Afghanistan in the fall of 1996
Notes: The figure is an excerpt from a book by Dorronsoro (2005). We georeference the green
area as the area formerly under Taliban control, and the other three polygons as not under Taliban
control.
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H. Data coding and map generation
Processing and trafficking
There is little to no information that is publicly available on trafficking routes that might
be used to smuggle opium through and out of the country. Nevertheless, the UN Office
on Drugs and Crime creates and contains spatial maps in its public reports. We were
able to digitize a UNODC map from 2007 (about the middle of our sample period) by
taking image files of the maps themselves and georeferencing specific points on the images
(border points) to a geographically accurate projection of Afghanistan. This process was
continued until the map and the images matched perfectly. We then digitized the data
contained in the image about the important roads used for trafficking, and the other
variables such as main opium markets, heroin processing labs.
Original UNODC map (2007)
Map making process: The source of the original map comes is the UNODC’s 2007
Afghanistan Opium Survey. The map depicts major and secondary roads, main cities,
opium markets, border crossing points, and processing labs. We also used the 2009
Afghanistan Opium Survey to cross-validate the data points. In almost all cases, there
were no changes between the two years. In case the 2009 map identifies additional markets
or labs we added these as data points. Given that the location of illegal markets and labs
will always contain some measurement error and could be moved over time, our aim is to
code variables that measure the potential for a trafficking route, border crossing, market
or lab. This means that the indicators that we create are time-invarying, also due to
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the availability of data. We interact the binary indicators extracted from the map with
an exogenous variable, so that the interaction term can be interpreted as causal under
relatively mild circumstances.
Superimposed maps
In the next step of the process, we match the borders of the image
and the georeferenced (Coordinate system GCS WGS 1984) shapefile
for Afghan authorities (ESOC Princeton, https://esoc.princeton.edu/files/
administrative-boundaries-398-districts). This way, we are accurately overlaying
the data points and not simply making an educated guess as to where to place the
points. Below are the two final digitized maps based on the UNODC data, overlaid with
the district data. The binary indicators that we use in Section 6 on heterogeneous effects
are coded as one if the respective feature is present within the boundaries of the district
polygon at least once. Alternatively, we use the number of feature per district, e.g., for
opium markets.
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Figure 27
Final map 1
Notes: The dots indicate district-specific centroids, and the black lines are the shortest roads
connections to the other centroids in the network. To compute market access, the same computation
is done for every centroid in the district, leading to different optimal road connections. The distances
are then used as weights and multiplied with the importance of the respective network members, in
this case the number of drug markets. Sources: UNODC (2016), Open Street Map and Afghanistan
Information Management Service (AIMS).
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Figure 28
Final map 2
Notes: he map shows the four major ethnic groups in Afghanistan in different shades of green
(Source: GREG). The white symbols with the black dots indicate the location of a foreign military
base, for which we could track location, opening and closing date (sources in detail in the appendix).
The area south of the thick black line was controlled by the Taliban prior to 2001. (Dorronsoro,
2005).
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Major military bases
This section describes how we determine the locations of major known military bases
in Afghanistan. There are nearly 400 foreign military bases in Afghanistan, but the
bases mostly release no official information as to their geographic location for security
reasons. In order to find this information, we compile data from different sources about
the most relevant bases to include, where exactly (latitude and longitude coordinates)
these bases are (or were; many are now closed). We rely on information from Wikipedia’s
GeoHack program for the more well-known bases and on news articles, Wikimapia and
Google Maps satellite data for the less well-documented ones. News articles were useful
in this case because they are often allowed to publish the district in which these bases are
located; from there, we were able to look for these bases by referencing photos of the bases
(if available) with available satellite data to verify their location. Below, we show the
table with the locations of the about 50 bases that we could identify. The exact locations
are blackened out for confidentiality reasons, even though we are convinced none of this
information is confidential and could be misused or endanger soldiers. Without access to
confidential NATO and US military information this is the best data we could assemble.
It is certainly not a complete list of bases, which introduces considerable measurement
error to the indicator variable we create based on it. At the same time, we have no reason
to expect this measurement error to be non-normal.
Main bases and relevant information (1/2)
This table shows the available data for about 50 bases that we deemed to be the most
important foreign bases in Afghanistan over the last 15 years. We list the name, type,
location (coordinate system CGS WGS 1984 ), militaries present (countries of origin),
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Main bases and relevant information (2/2)
district in which the base is located, date opened and closed (a “.” in the opened or closed
section means there is either no data for closure time or that the base is still open. See
Field9 for explanatory notes in these cases), and general notes of interest.
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Confirming the location of these districts using satellite
This is an example of what the Wikimapia satellite imagery we used to locate bases
looks like. This is an image of Base Blackhorse, which is now closed. We were able to
locate this as Base Blackhorse by first searching for the camp on wikimapia which offered
two possible locations (approximately 9 miles away from each other) where the base could
be. After we discovered in a news report that the base was located next to an Afghan
National Army base, which was itself located on the site of the Pul-e-Charkhi-Prison, we
were able to determine the definitive location of the prison and thus the location of the
base.
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Definitions and explanation of how each base was found. Below, we have laid
out the definitions for what each type of base exists in Afghanistan and explained how
we determined the specific locations for each base we included. The base definitions are
important to know because the type of base is a good indicator of its size. Though this was
of course not the only criteria we used to determine whether or not a specific base should
be represented on the map, it was important for weeding out those that are not included
(for example, we included no firebases on account of their temporary and generally small
size). Below this, we provide more detail about specific bases whose locations we were
not able to get from the GeoHack database, in which bases are supposed to have had
multiple confirmations. These bases were found using satellite data and through available
news reports, photos and satellite imagery. All definitions below are adapted or directly
from Wikipedia to provide a rough idea about the types of military bases that exist in
Afghanistan. We do not rely on the distinctions and simply code whether there is an
open base or not.
Additional information about bases (from wikipedia):
• Definition FOB - A forward operating base (FOB) is any secured forward military
position, commonly a military base, that is used to support tactical operations. A
FOB may or may not contain an airfield, hospital, or other facilities. The base may
be used for an extended period of time. FOBs are traditionally supported by Main
Operating Bases that are required to provide backup support to them. A FOB also
improves reaction time to local areas as opposed to having all troops on the main
operating base.
• Definition MOB - A MOB is a term used by the United States military defined as
a permanently manned, well protected base, used to support permanently deployed
forces, and with robust sea and/or air access.
• Definition COP - A combat outpost is a detachment of troops stationed at a distance
from the main force or formation, usually at a station in a remote or sparsely
populated location, positioned to stand guard against unauthorized intrusions and
surprise attacks; the station is occupied by troops, it is usually a small military
base or settlement in an outlying frontier, limit, political boundary or in a foreign
country.
• Definition Firebase - A temporary military encampment to provide artillery fire
support to infantry operating in areas beyond the normal range of fire support
from their own base camps.
• Definition Camp - A semi-permanent facility for the lodging of an army. Camps are
erected when a military force travels away from a major installation or fort during
training or operations, and often have the form of large campsites.
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• Definition Base - A facility directly owned and operated by or for the military or
one of its branches that shelters military equipment and personnel, and facilitates
training and operations. In general, a military base provides accommodations for
one or more units, but it may also be used as a command center, a training ground,
or a proving ground. In most cases, a military base relies on some outside help in
order to operate. However, certain complex bases are able to endure by themselves
for long periods because they are able to provide food, water and other life support
necessities for their inhabitants while under siege.
All locations are taken from Wikimedia’s GeoHack program if available. We do not
consider Firebases and COPs, which are smaller and often temporary outposts. In
addition, we found or updated the information for the following cases:
1. COP/FOB Zangabad has been coded as FOB Pasab. This was the most likely
location for a forward operating base close the Zhari/Panjwayi district border.
Exact location determined as such using Wikimapia satelite imagery. It is coded
as being in the district of Panjwayi.
2. Camp/FOB Hadrian location determined using Wikimapia satellite imagery.
3. Camp Russell location determined using Wikimapia satellite imagery in relation to
Camp Holland.
4. Camp Arena, Camp Vianini, and Camp Stone are each in roughly the same area.
Using Wikimapia imagery, we assume that Camp Arena, the only camp with an
Italian Air Force presence, is located at the airfield in Hirat. Camp Vianini and
Camp Stone were assigned their locations using Wikimapia imagery as well. We
believe Camp Vianini to be at the location we chose based on the fact that an
Italian artillery regiment was attacked at that location and we believe the Italian
Army was the only major force at Camp Vianini. Camp Stone, which has multiple
country forces at its location, is expected to be south of the airport and Camp
Arena, according to Wikimapia data.
5. Camp Blackhorse determined using Wikimapia and various sources citing the camp
to be adjacent to the Pul-e-Charkhi ANA compound.
6. Camp Clark determined using Wikimapia satellite imagery.
7. Camp Warehouse determined using Wikimapia satellite imagery.
8. Camp Phoenix location determined using google maps and Wikimapia satellite
data.
9. Camp Invicta located using Wikimapia satellite data.
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10. FOB Hamidullah located using Wikimapia satellite data. In Wikimapia, the
location is described as FOB Nolay, the previous name of the base.
11. Camp Blessing located using Wikimapia satellite data.
12. FOB Joyce located using satellite data and with news articles stating that FOB
Joyce is within/very close to the village of Serkanay.
13. Camp Wright located using Wikimapia and Google Maps satellite data; it is listed
as “USA Army Base” on the Wikimapia site.
Final map of located military installations
This map shows the geographic location of the bases that we identified. Some bases
are not visible in this view as a result of closely overlapping with other bases, in which
case the map displays only one symbol.
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